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ABSTRACT
TOWARD SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS: SCHOOL QUALITY & THE
EQUITABLE REVITALIZATION OF NEIGHBORHOODS
Kenneth Steif
Eugenie Birch
High housing costs and variation in the willingness to pay for school quality helps
foster regional income inequality across space and the relegation of low-income
families to neighborhoods with low quality schools. This dynamic in part,
explains why Philadelphia’s public school system has failed; why its children are
under-educated and why despite renewed demand for housing in certain
neighborhoods, the City still struggles economically. Nevertheless, this research
demonstrates econometrically that Philadelphia households are willing to pay a
significant price premium to live in neighborhoods with high quality public
schools. This fact is used to motivate a new intervention that leverages the
housing investment of the middle-class to realign the supply of and demand for
public goods like neighborhood schools. The proposed program repurposes the
Improvement District framework to fund new local school quality. The equity
component of the plan, it is argued, can potentially break the spatial pattern of
income segregation by fostering mixed-income neighborhoods and diminish the
threat of displacement which will likely occur as new school quality is capitalized
in to local home prices. It is concluded that schools are more than drivers of
human capital development, they are also engines of neighborhood economic
development as well.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

With enough investigation, it becomes clear that education is among the few
policy mechanisms that can solve the city’s most chronic dilemma intergenerational poverty. The dearth of educational opportunities in cities has
reached cancerous proportions, perpetuating segregation and stifling upward
mobility1. This research investigates how school quality affects the economic
vitality of urban neighborhoods and the people who reside there. Failed schools
are often exemplified in cities, working in combination with other symptoms of
poverty to paint a vivid portrait of urban decline. Although education is a national
agenda topic, failed schools, lackluster academic outcomes and new avenues for
reform have generated fierce debate over the future urban education in cities like
Philadelphia, Chicago and New Orleans. What dynamics are to blame and what
if anything can planning do to remedy the situation?

In 1977, the College Board, the group that administers the Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT), published a report claiming "No topic related to the programs of the
College Board has received more public attention in recent years than the
unexplained decline in scores earned by students on..." the SAT. Among a slew
of potential causes, the report claimed that two-thirds to three-fourths of overall
test score declines can be attributed to an increase in minority student test
takers. The authors conclude that “what decline reflects is the incompleteness

1

Chetty et al, 2013

1

so far, of the national undertaking to afford meaningful equality of educational
opportunity2."

In another call to arms, a 1983 report by the U.S. Department of Education
entitled "A Nation at Risk" exclaimed, "If an unfriendly foreign power had
attempted to impose on America the mediocre education performance that exists
today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands we have
allowed this to happen to ourselves3."

That education decline is akin to a foreign act of hostility is more than just colorful
rhetoric. Thirty years after “Nation at Risk”, the evidence still suggests that many
of our students, even those in the highest performing states still struggle to
compete with top performing countries in math and science4. There are serious
economic repercussions of these inadequacies, particularly given the
tremendous private returns to education. Across a multitude of studies, the
average return for one additional year of education in the U.S. is a staggering
10%5. A decline in this rate of return could easily strangle U.S. economic output
and degrade our influence on the international stage.

The economics of agglomeration provide motivation for why this return is critical
for the success of cities as well. It takes a critical mass of educated individuals to

2

College Board (1977)
National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983)
National Center for Educational Statistics (2013)
5
Psacharopoulis & Patrinos (2004)
3
4
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produce enough economic activity for a city to prosper. Historically, it has been
very difficult to untangle to the effect of cities on human capital development. It
could be that productive places generate productive workers or that productive
places attract productive workers6. We know that there is a positive correlation
between city size and learning effects7 but there's also casual evidence linking
the existence of educational assets in cities with higher wage earners8.

Aside from institutional factors, peer effects play a role as well. Workers in cities
with higher proportions of college graduates see their wages increase at a faster
rate over time than workers in less educated cities9. This means that
independent of your actual job, whether you're a gas station attendant, barista or
insurance salesman - your salary is dependent, in part on how well educated
other people in your city are.

With this evidence at hand, it is astounding that contemporary urban economic
development policy is still focused on attraction strategies defined by buzzwords
like ‘Creative Class’ and ‘Innovation Districts’10. While these mechanisms may
be effective for luring young, skilled workers to cities, it is disappointing that equal
emphasis has not been put on growing human capital at home. In fact, it is

6

Henderson (2003)
Glaeser & Mare (2001)
8
Knowing that existence of universities in a city is highly correlated with education outcomes, Moretti (2004) compares
city-level outcomes for cities endowed with land grant colleges to those without. The assumption is that "having a
university may simply be the effect, not the cause of a skilled populace", but land grant colleges, which established by the
Federal Government and were not contingent local city conditions, make a plausible control group. He finds that the
presence of a land grant college results in a significant increase in both college graduates and wages.
9
Moretti (2012)
10
Florida's (2002); Katz & Wagner (2014)
7
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surprising generally, that more emphasis isn’t given to education as a driver of
economic development11.

Some basic employment figures suggest that this may be an oversight on behalf
economic development planners. Nationally, the five largest unified school
districts with respect to spending - New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dade
County, Fl., and Philadelphia, averaged more than $9 billion worth of
expenditures in 2011. These institutions are regional employment powerhouses.
In 2011, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Chicago employed 63,708; 23,451 and
27,539 teachers and staff respectively 12. And while these entities pump billions
in to the economy, public schools in urban areas are still characterized by poor
teacher quality, lackluster teaching environments (physical plant, etc.) large class
sizes, a dearth of technology, low academic achievement and funding levels that
are unable, at least at their current levels, to overcome the burden of
concentrated intergenerational poverty13.

Furthermore, the achievement gap between high and low-income students is
30%-40% greater today than it was twenty-five years ago14, and students living in
urban areas exhibit higher dropout rates and lower achievement than their
suburban peers15. These conditions fuel a negative feedback cycle where low

11

There is likely more attention paid to higher education as a means of economic development. In the context of this
research, the reference is more to primary and secondary education.
12
National Center for Education Statistics (2013)
13
Anyon (2005)
14
Reardon (2011)
15
Roscigno et al (2006)
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quality schools yield ill-prepared students who grow up to earn disproportionally
lower wages and are forced to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods with lowquality schools. What makes these dynamics even more dangerous is that these
outcomes effect both human capital potential of individuals and the economic
potential of entire neighborhoods. Without breaking this feedback cycle, the
likely fate of these places is either continued stagnation and decline or increased
economic inequality.

In Philadelphia, these realities front newspaper and blog pages on a daily basis.
The Philadelphia School District is wrestling with a $400 million deficit. To close
the gap, in March of 2013, the school district voted to close 23 schools16. The
following June, Superintendent William Hite announced the layoffs of 3,700
employees - nearly 20% of the total District workforce, including teachers,
secretaries, counselors, assistant principals, secretaries, librarians and others17.
At a press conference, Superintendent Hite said, "The School District of
Philadelphia must live within its means. We can only spend the revenues that
are given to us by the city and the state. This is the harsh reality of how that
looks18." This harsh reality looks downright bad for schools across the City.
West Philadelphia’s Bryant Elementary was forced to reduce the number of days
it kept a school nurse on site to just two days a week. On an off day, September
25th, 2013, Laporcha Massey, a student, complained of breathing problems.

16
17
18

Hurdle (2013)
Mezzacappa (2013)
Ibid.
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She was sent home then taken to a local hospital by her parents where she later
died from asthma complications19. In the wake of the tragedy, just days later,
then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett released $45 million in state aid for
Philadelphia schools. Although the governor had previously withheld the money
in lieu of concessions from the teacher's union, the funds could now be used to
hire back 400 teachers and staff20.

Forty-five million dollars hardly makes up for the $1 billion dollars of state
education financing that was slashed from the governor's 2011 budget - much of
it a consequence of expiring federal stimulus funds21. It was this budget that
forced Philadelphia's School District into its current fiscal crisis, and since then,
the State legislature has refused to invest more. Despite the political division that
exists between a predominately Republican state legislature and a predominately
Democratic Philadelphia caucus, real inequities exist in the State’s school
funding formula. According to a recent article in the Washington Post, per-pupil
spending in Pennsylvania’s poorest school districts, like Philadelphia, is 33%
lower than spending in the State’s wealthiest districts – the highest differential in
the U.S.22. Although state education subsidies to Philadelphia likely spillover into
positive economic gains for the entire state economy, it does not preclude the
political reality that discourages a Republican officials from redistributing more
rural and suburban tax dollars to Philadelphia students.

19

Whites-Koditschek (2013)
Snyder et al. (2013)
Couloumbis (2013)
22
Brown (2015)
20
21
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We often associate this sort of fiscal redistribution with equity, and although
society agrees that education is worth subsidizing, there is clearly less
agreement on who should pay for it. Education was not always a public good.
The original public school (re)formers had to convince Americans that the human
capital benefits of public education outweighed the additional taxation. By touting
the positive effect of education on immigrant assimilation, poverty reduction, and
labor force improvement, the debate focused not on whether taxes should be
used to fund education but on how much23.

The local property tax has been the traditional financing mechanism for schools,
but in response to ailing urban economies and burgeoning funding inequality, a
push was made in the 1970s toward a more centralized financing model. In
Philadelphia’s case, if the spigot of state aid for schools were to be permanently
shut, local property taxes alone would not be sufficient for preventing additional
school closings and the continued degradation of school quality. Given these
fiscal hardships and the City’s legal mandate to provide public education, what
alternative models can a city like Philadelphia choose from if not traditional public
schools?

One option is charter schools. According to the most current data from the
National Center for Education Statistics there are 6,212 charter schools operating

23

Katz (2013)
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across 40 states nationwide (6% of all schools).24 There are 85 currently
operating in Philadelphia serving 45% of the overall District enrollment25.
Charters introduce choice into the education marketplace and households faced
with the prospect of sending their children to a failed neighborhood school may
choose a charter if it provides a higher quality alternative. However, school
choice does not exist in a vacuum. Oftentimes, a choice for or against a school
is a choice for or against an entire neighborhood and when an entire region
chooses likewise, these dynamics are powerful enough to carve cities and
regions in to segregated enclaves.

This dissertation targets school and neighborhood choice as the primary
mechanism that reinforces concentrated intergenerational urban poverty. The
research in this dissertation goes beyond asserting simply that increased school
quality can help end this legacy. It argues that planners can exploit
neighborhood choice to “reprogram” the spatial orientation of neighborhoods, the
tax revenues they generate and the school quality they produce. There are two
main research questions: In order to establish just how important good schools
are toward the economic vitality of neighborhoods and to justify a schools-centric
intervention, the first question asks how much are Philadelphia home buyers
willing to pay for quality schools both Citywide and in the case where a new high
quality school was opened in a neighborhood that previously did not have one.
The second questions asks, given the role of quality schools in neighborhood

24
25

National Center for Education Statistics (2013)
Philadelphia School District (2015)
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economic development, is it possible for planners to develop a new placed-based
intervention that uses school quality as a means to equitably revitalize
neighborhoods?

This dissertation advocates that planners repurpose the Business Improvement
District framework to fund local schools, but instead of bounding the District to
include a homogenous area (like a downtown, for istance), this intervention
suggests the demarcation of a mixed-income neighborhood. It argues that these
‘School Improvement Districts’ can foster both equitable neighborhood economic
development and increased human capital development.

The following chapter provides an in-depth literature review that explores the
causes of urban and regional income segmentation and how planners can work
towards breaking down this pattern. Chapter 3 provides some background on
one particular school quality intervention that is later used to address the first
research question – the willingness to pay for high quality schools in
Philadelphia. Chapter 4 outlines the econometric research design used for
research question one and then describes a set of policy-related questions asked
of local experts whose experience is relevant to the School Improvement District
framework. Chapter 5 presents the results of the school quality econometric
study. Chapter 6 simulates the School Improvement District planning process
and then discusses relevant planning issues informed by the expert interviews.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes. Three appendices complete the study. The first

9

describes an analysis that finds a positive relationship between the number of
students scoring proficient or advanced on math and reading test scores and
student racial diversity in Philadelphia elementary schools. It is intended to help
defend the idea that not only can School Improvement Districts effect
neighborhood economic development, but that the income mixing they foster can
also increase human capital returns, as well. The second appendix is a twopage policy brief that provides some background for interview respondents. The
third lists the questions asked of experts who were gracious enough to be
interviewed for this project.

10

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Although it may sound like an unusual focal point for motivating a school-related
intervention, this literature review is assembled around the following question,
‘why is it that across any given region, income segregation is a major feature of
the built environment and what lessons can this outcome teach us when planning
productive and equitable neighborhood interventions?” There are three
interrelated streams of literature that help answer this question. The first stream
discusses what makes schools productive and argues that their low productivity
in Philadelphia has led to a failed public school system and the rise of school
choice. It argues that these alternative, market-based models which incentivize
across neighborhood mobility, decouple schools from their surrounding
neighborhoods which can have dire repercussions for neighborhood economic
development. The second strand of literature links school choice to
neighborhood choice, and argues that if left unchecked, neighborhood choice
produces negative outcomes for those who cannot afford to be choosy. The third
stream puts neighborhood choice in the dynamic context of gentrification as a
dynamic urban process and describes how government intervention in housing
markets is required in order to balance growth and equity. The final section of
this review puts all of these pieces together to inform the particulars of a
proposed School Improvement District program. Bounding these four threads is
a discussion of the current school financing crisis in Philadelphia.

11

The production of education in the U.S.

Following a severe decline in education outcomes in the 1970s, researchers
have been working to identify the drivers of school productivity. Their goal has
been to examine how school outcomes are influenced by different school-related
expenditures26. The literature that has emerged has a long and varied trajectory.
Forming the basis for debate in this field is the finding that positive school
outcomes are not so easily explained by traditional measures of school quality27.
This conclusion is perhaps unsurprising given the number of relatively intangible
variables behind the probability of one’s success in school.

Stanford researcher Erik Hanushek is at the forefront of this debate and has
authored several comprehensive reviews on the subject of ‘input-based
schooling policies’28. He notes that although real spending per pupil saw an
annual average increase of 3.5% between 1890 and 1990, student performance,
specifically in the sciences, was lower in 1999 than in 1970. He suggests that,
“Eager to improve quality and unable to do it directly, government policy typically
moves to what is thought to be the next best thing – providing added resources
to schools.” This strategy, he claims, has proven “ineffective.”

26

Pritchett & Filmer (1997)
Betts (1995). Traditional measures of school quality include teacher salaries, teacher quality, student/teacher ratio,
teacher experience, enrollment and others.
28
Among them includes Hanushek (1989; 2003; 2004)
27
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The literature does conclude that there is no one recipe for achieving success.
Additional expenditures can play a role, but what really matters is an
understanding of which value-added approaches are effective and which need to
be revamped29. For example, given their limited resources, should a school
district spend money on better teachers or smaller class sizes? School vouchers
or charter schools? This understanding, researchers argue, must be driven by
strong program evaluations based on testable hypotheses and experimental
evidence30. Examples of value-added program evaluations include early
childhood education31; the impacts of quality teachers32; teacher bonuses33; and
smaller class sizes34.

The impetus for experimental approaches is that the level of resources given to a
particular school district, school, classroom or individual student is at least
partially a function of student outcomes35. Many of the intangibles that contribute
to student success are often difficult to separate from what the student might
experience in the classroom. For instance, the neighborhood in which a child
grows up has a significant effect on educational attainment36. As traditional
public schools are placed-based, these “peer effects” can permeate into the
classroom. While the evidence on peer effects in general is mixed, studies have

29

Hattie (2013); Hanushek (2003).
Ellis (2014)
31
See Reynolds et al. (2002) and Heckman (2006) for a thorough review. Experimental evidences includes the Perry
Preschool Program (Schweinhart et al., 2005) and the Abecodarian program (Campbell et al., 2002).
30

32

Braun (2005) & Rothstein (2009) for review; Chetty et al. (2010) and Chetty et. Al. (2013) for experimental evidence.
Eberts et al. (2002) and Podgursky & Springer (2007) for reviews; Springer et al. (2011) for experimental evidence.
34
Achilles (2003) for a review. Finn & Achilles (1999), Finn et al. (2005) and Chetty et al. (2010) for experimental
evidence.
35
Houtenville & Conway (2008).
36
Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn (2000); Ravitch (2011).
33
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found that peers do play a role in outcomes for several important social
contexts37. Research presented in Technical Appendix 1 of this dissertation finds
that more student diversity at the school-level is associated with positive test
score outcomes in Philadelphia elementary schools.

In practice, peer effects mean that the performance of one student is correlated
with the average of his peers38, and if this is the case, it can bias our empirical
understanding about the role of different value-added interventions. A study
might find that good teachers increase their student’s test scores, but it is entirely
possible that this result is driven by the socioeconomic makeup of different
classrooms. Researchers often attempt to hold both these neighborhood and
classroom peer effects constant while identifying program efficacy.

Charters and school choice

Given the School District of Philadelphia’s current fiscal crisis, it is unlikely that
new, value-added reforms could be introduced in classrooms. In fact, the
opposite has been occurring. Its mounting deficit has forced the school district to
engage in a wide array of cuts that are effecting not only schools but the
neighborhoods that surround those schools as well.

37

See Sacerdote (2011) for a review. Hoxby (2000) finds significantly positive peer effect associated with an increase in
the number of females in a school cohort. She also finds a significant intra-race peer effect. Gaviria & Raphael (2001)
report very large peer effects with respect to drug use, drinking, cigarettes and high school dropout. Methodologically, the
concern is that peer effects are highly non-linear. That is, the spillover effect resulting from the presence of an additional
student will vary depending on whether that student achieves in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th quartile (Hoxby & Weingarth, 2005).
38
Angrist (2014).
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In spring, 2013, school superintendent William Hite laid off 3,800 employees39.
The following spring, he threatened that unless the District was awarded $100
million from the State as a short-term fiscal band aid, he would lay-off an
additional 810 teachers40. These cuts would increase high school classroom size
from 33 students to 41 students on average.

Over the last three decades, a variety of alternative education models have been
developed around the country. In Philadelphia, the charter school model has
emerged at the center of the City’s school reform agenda – a direct consequence
of its current fiscal crisis. Although the original purpose of charter schools was to
provide a laboratory for educators to experiment with new value-added models,41
in Philadelphia, the motivation is marked by fiscal necessity.

Charters receive the same per-pupil funding as public schools but shift the
responsibility of public education away from a centralized bureaucracy like a
school district and into the hands of privately managed, independent operators.
Unlike traditional public schools in Philadelphia which draw students from the
surrounding neighborhood, many charters take students from across the city42.

39

Mezzacappa (2013)
Mezzacappa (2013)
41
Center for Public Education (2010).
42
There is a small but growing number of charter schools in Philadelphia that are neighborhood based. Although, these
programs are only a few years old, the smaller class sizes and tutoring programs have shown promise (Gold et al. 2012;
Westervelt, 2013).
40
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The motivation for charters came out of the government entrepreneurism
movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s43. Advocates suggested that public
institutions should be retrofitted with private-sector management strategies -replacing bureaucracy with markets44. Osborne & Gaebler’s, Reinventing
Government (1993), touted these ideals suggesting that in order for government
to provide a quality product, its "business model" should be informed by several
key market-oriented approaches. Chief among these is efficiency; the idea that if
we are going to allocate tax dollars to increase social welfare, we should choose
a mechanism from which the benefits outweigh the costs. Second, the authors
suggest that local community empowerment and local control is more efficient
than centralized control; and that inducing firms, households and governments to
make "better" choices requires that incentives be properly aligned.

The often-cited rationale for introducing choice into education is that it breeds
competition, and forces schools to be more effective and efficient or else risk
losing students to more productive schools 45. Since choice works in the
business world, some argue, it should also work in education46. The critical
response to this justification is that market oriented solutions are not always best
for addressing socioeconomic deficiencies rooted in centuries of inequality47.
Although, it is likely that schools and their consumers will change their behavior
given new, choice-generated market incentives, the question is, to what extent

43

Osborne & Gaebler (1993)
Katz & Jones (2013)
45
Jenks (1970); Checci (2006)
46
Ravitch (2011)
47
Cucchiara (2013)
44
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will this occur and will it result in Pareto efficient outcomes48? This is an
exceedingly difficult question to answer particularly if we consider that some
families may not have all the pertinent information that might otherwise lead to a
productive choice. In this case, an extra degree of choice is not likely to lead to
productive outcomes for their children.

Theory aside, nearly two decades of charter evaluations paints at best, a mixed
picture of outcomes. Many evaluations compare charter outcomes to those of
traditional public schools without consideration for the heterogeneous nature of
charter curricula49. In addition, as before, improperly accounting for the
otherwise unobserved traits of students (such as neighborhood and other peer
effects) can lead to biased evaluations50.

One of the largest meta-analysis of charter school outcomes characterizes
charter school evaluations by their empirical rigor51. When only the strongest
studies are included, the authors find no difference between charters and
traditional public schools. The authors found that of the 38 states that had
charter laws on the books at the time of publication (2004), only 8 states had
independent evaluations based upon defensible research designs.

48

Checci (2006)
Teasley (2009)
Eberts & Hollenback (2002)
51
Miron & Nelson (2004)
49
50
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Since that time, additional evaluations have studied charter outcomes by using a
random assignment approach. This strategy compares outcomes for students
who won charter admission lotteries to outcomes for those who entered lotteries
but lost. This design helps deal with selection bias52. Two such studies in New
York City and Chicago have shown that students who won lotteries and attended
charters performed modestly better than their peers who lost53. In a comparable
study from Boston, researchers found much more pronounced positive effects for
students who won charter lotteries54. These studies find that positive outcomes
are associated with value-added measures including the number of years a
charter has been operational; a longer school year; and smaller class size.

Unlike Boston and New York, the catalyst to move to charters in Philadelphia
was not to test innovative models but to address fiscal insolvency55. These
contextual differences suggest that outcomes from cities like Boston and New
York may not be generalizable to Philadelphia. Entrepreneurs looking to take
advantage of new market opportunities by opening new schools may be putting
additional pressure on the District to approve more charters. In this case, it is
important to point out the that research shows that new charter schools are less
effective than more established ones56.
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There is one precedent for Philadelphia’s current situation. No other city took to
charters as a solution to its crippled school district more than New Orleans which
was carrying $250 million in debt before Hurricane Katrina made landfall57. The
storm destroyed more than 100 of its 120 schools and forced an estimated
50,000 students to relocate to other schools around the country58. From the
rubble emerged charter schools which, as of 2010, comprised 61 of 88 public
schools in New Orleans59. In 2014, New Orleans became the nation’s first major
urban school district to be comprised entirely of charter schools60.

What do charters have to do with School Improvement Districts? Inherent in
school choice is the ability for charters to admit students from across the city. If
parents choose to pull a child from a neighborhood school and send the child
across town to a charter, the parents are not only choosing against the
neighborhood school but the surrounding neighborhood as well. In fact, these
choices can have detrimental effects on the broader school financing landscape,
on social capital formation and on neighborhood economic development.

Toward the financing issue, consider that each new charter deepens the
Philadelphia School District’s already calamitous deficit. Due to the publically
funded/privately managed nature of charters, when a student leaves a traditional
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neighborhood public school for a charter, the School District must transfer
funding from its budget to that of the charter school. A portion of these losses
are fixed costs like the maintenance on buildings, teacher salaries and pensions
which can only be offset by cutting costs. This compounds an already dire fiscal
situation, as increasing numbers of students who transfer to charters further
causes the School District to close neighborhood schools and/or lay off teachers.
Not only does this continued degradation widen the District’s fiscal hole but it
also lowers demand for neighborhood schools as well61.

Yet another benefit of neighborhood-anchored public schools is that they are part
of a system that promotes and develops social capital62. The ‘neighborhood unit’
concept first described in the late 1920s advocates for the school as the focal
point of a neighborhood, making it the central gathering place for residents to
meet, recreate and even organize63. Evidence also suggests that urban
neighborhood schools help promote positive health outcomes and limit a child's
exposure to excessive traffic or crime64. Not surprisingly, education researchers
believe that healthy neighborhood schools are the cornerstone of healthy
neighborhoods65.
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Lastly, and most critical for this research is that a move to charters may inhibit
local economic development generated by neighborhood schools. While wellmanaged charters may produce positive education outcomes, the induced
across-neighborhood mobility might also erode the economic anchor relationship
between a traditional public school and its surrounding neighborhood. See
Chapter 5 for an explanation of how good schools effect neighborhood housing
markets.

There is a large literature on the premium households are willing to pay for
quality neighborhood schools66. These premiums vary as new data and new
statistical techniques emerge over time67. Early research found little evidence
that school quality was capitalized into neighborhood home prices68. Research
from the 1970s and 1980s found a positive capitalization effect for both school
expenditures and test scores69. More contemporary approaches estimate wideranging price premiums associated with good schools70. A one standard
deviation increase in school quality can lead to a home price premium as varied
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as one to ten percent71. These results suggest that the price premium
associated with “good schools” in one city is likely not generalizable to others72.
A second issue with this literature is that it is cross-sectional which does not help
us to understand what how the introduction of school quality where it previously
did not exist might affect the neighborhood change process. Finally, while much
research relating home prices to public school outcomes exists, just one paper
investigates the role of charters and finds very weak evidence of positive
capitalization effects73. This dissertation adds to this literature by estimating
school quality-driven price premiums in a policy context driven by Philadelphia’s
fiscally insolvent public school district.

Aside from the need to balance land use goals and school enrollment projections
in the comprehensive planning process, education policy is typically not within
the professional purview of city planners. Nevertheless, it is argued that school
choice as a dynamic urban process can have serious ramifications on the
economic and social wellbeing of neighborhoods. The consequences of choice
are further complicated by the fact that not only are city neighborhoods and
neighborhood schools in competition with each other – they are in competition
with places from across the region as well. Thus, to understand fully, the
economic impacts of school choice, we must understand how choice effects
regional housing markets. Through a nuanced appreciation of these dynamics,
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planners can begin to craft more productive and equitable neighborhood-level
interventions.

Neighborhood Choice
School financing decisions and school choice effect entire neighborhoods.
Public schools and their surrounding neighborhoods are fundamentally linked to
one another. Intervention in one domain will have effects in the other. To
understand this process, one must understand that a neighborhood is not an
autonomous entity but a peripheral that exists as part of a larger system of
interconnected places in a region. Choice for one place is a choice against
another; and millions of choices over forty or fifty years can result in widespread
spatial segmentation across an entire region. Upper income families typically live
together by choice. While lower income families are similarly clustered, their
choices are limited by economic realities that often relegate them to poorly
served places. While this outcome sounds bleak, it is only through an
understanding of these dynamics that we can begin to think about how to
harness the power of neighborhood choice to positively affect the situation.

In his seminal paper, Tiebout focuses on the “consumer-voter” who chooses
among a series of regional alternatives, one “which best satisfies his preference
pattern for public goods74.” As is the case in any market, “The greater the
number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the
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consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position75.” Thus, the
consumer will exercise his choice for a community that best suits his needs.

There are costs associated with this choice, most notably the cost of public
services and amenities76. Households consider these conditions when deciding
where to live and how much to pay for housing. Locations that have poor
amenities and unattractive fiscal conditions struggle to attract high income
residents which is why downtrodden cities are often defined by struggling real
estate markets.

The property tax is the principal mechanism by which municipalities fund public
services. Communities are free to set property tax rates according to the level of
services desired by residents. This system works well if all residents are willing
or able to pay an amount exactly equal to the value of the services they
consume. It quickly breaks down however, if value-seeking consumer-voters
attempt to ‘free-ride’ by paying for less services than they consume77. How does
this work? Consider the following stylized example: Imagine a town comprised
only of households with school-aged children who all attend the local school. In
this town, the zoning code requires that every house be built on 1 acre of land
and each household pay $1,000 in taxes annually for the only public service in
town -- the school. In this situation everyone pays $1,000 in taxes and receives
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$1,000 in school quality. Now imagine that the zoning code is altered to allow
the 1 acre plots to be split in half such that each half acre lot now contains its
own home with new students to attend the local school. The homeowners on
these plots are still receiving $1,000 worth of school quality, but they're only
paying $500 for the privilege.

Given enough half-plotters, the quality of schools may decline because the town
is funding more students with less revenue. This might be particularly upsetting
for those households paying $1000 in taxes and it might incentivize them to pick
up and choose another community where they are assured value in exchange for
their taxes. This loss of tax revenue would further degrade school quality in the
town.

To prevent free-riders, suburban municipalities often employ fiscal zoning – a
standard that ensures each household consumes an amount of taxable land
equal to cost of the services they consume78. As such, any household that
cannot afford to purchase so much land or pay so much in taxes is automatically
excluded from locating in that suburb and consuming its services. This may
seem unfair, particularly in the realm of education, which is often thought of as a
public good79. Land use controls like fiscal zoning blur the line between public
and private goods and make it possible for a community to exclude. By providing
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schools in a manner best suited to the needs of local residents public education
becomes less of a quasi-public good and more of a “club good”80. While fiscal
zoning is advantageous to the economic health of a suburban community, it is
exclusionary and clearly detrimental to low-income residents who might
otherwise benefit from consuming higher quality schools81.

Disinvested communities do not emerge randomly. They are the consequence of
a collective action; a preference for certain places by those who can afford to be
choosy. Choice, be it at the municipal or neighborhood level is the principal
driver of economic segregation. Some context for this assertion is provided
below but for now consider that neighborhoods are more than just a physical
manifestation of space and certainly more than just a commodity to be bought
and sold. Neighborhoods provide the social and economic context in which
individuals interact and communicate with each other on an everyday basis.
Roland Benabou observes:
The accumulation of human capital underlies the evolution of both income
inequality and productivity growth. As demonstrated most vividly by the
physical blight and social pathology of inner-city schools, certain essential
inputs in this process are of a local nature. They are determined neither at
the level of individual families nor that of the whole economy, but at the
intermediate level of communities, neighborhoods, firms, or social
networks. Not only is this the case with school resources when funding is
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decentralized but also with many forms of “social capital”: peer effects,
role models, job contracts, norms of social behavior, crime, and so on.
Through these fiscal and sociological spillovers, the next generation’s
distribution of skills and incomes is shaped by the manner in which the
current one sorts itself in differentiated clusters82 (Emphasis added).

These shared social experiences can have dire consequences on the economic,
health and social wellbeing of residents who live in places of concentrated
poverty83. The ability for the middle-class to choose freely limits the development
of effective human capital institutions in disadvantaged places, and also
perpetuates a neighborhood context which inhibits the ability for students to learn
and achieve upward mobility84.

The Tieboutian choice process is one reason why many Philadelphia
neighborhoods can no longer support a public school. Between 1950 and 2010,
Philadelphia lost nearly a quarter of its population. Several mechanisms were at
work including widespread manufacturing loss, and the globalization of
employment85. In addition, government sponsored mortgage programs favored
greenfield development86, while construction of the federal highway system
fostered decentralization87 which enabled city residents to relocate to suburban
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locales88. As the middle class left cities they took their housing capital with them.
This major shift exasperated inner-city segregation89 creating a 'spatial mismatch'
between an urbanized labor force and an increasingly suburban employment
market90. In addition, it perpetuated vacancy by limiting demand in the face of a
fixed and durable housing supply91. Many cities and neighborhoods were left
with neither a sustainable demand for housing nor a sufficient tax-base to
support local public services.

Low-income families are attracted to cities like Philadelphia because of the
presence of inexpensive housing, public transportation and other low-cost city
services. Income diversity in cities makes fiscal zoning as an exclusionary tool
politically unfeasible. As a result, free ridership is particularly endemic in many
cities – to the point where we just refer to it diversity. Cities are enormously
redistributive92. A hypothetical family of three living in Philadelphia and earning
$75,000 annually pays 15.2% of its income in taxes93. This suggests that for
every dollar a middle-class family spends in taxes, they receive but a portion of
that in the form services, with the balance being allocated to needy residents
across the City. This situation arises out of the political realities of urban
governance and the responsibility of city governments to provide all residents
with basic services. It does so however, at the expense of households who can
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afford to choose other locations in the region. Those who remain, likely do so
because they value the agglomeration benefits that only a city can provide. Even
in this case however, these residents exercise choice, albeit at the neighborhood
level.

Although large tax/service imbalances may exist at the city level, they may be
less pronounced at the neighborhood scale. Neighborhoods tend to exhibit a
high degree of internal clustering with respect to race, income, home prices and
other characteristics. The same search parameters suburban households use to
choose among many regional alternatives are used by urban households to
choose among neighborhood alternatives. As is the case in suburbs, high
neighborhood home prices reflect higher quality services and amenities and
higher income residents. There is no fiscal zoning in cities but high housing
costs serve as an equally powerful exclusionary mechanism. Just as is the case
at the regional level, the symbiotic relationship between quality services and
affluent neighborhoods in cities gives rise to serious equity concerns for families
and students who live in poor neighborhoods. Notably, middle income families
who value urban amenities but long for higher quality schools, have recently
begun to raise funds for their local school. For example, non-profit “Friends of”
groups have begun popping up all over Philadelphia, soliciting donations from
residents on behalf of their neighborhood schools94. These groups are
comprised largely of middle-class households, and although many members
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have school-age children, the number of non-parent members are increasing95.
These groups are discussed in more depth in Chapter 6. The motivation for
“Friends of” groups is fairly obvious - they are attempting to make up for the
City’s inability to fund adequate school quality. Their existence begs the
question, why not have urban neighborhoods fund schools entirely on their own?

Try to imagine if a situation did indeed arise where neighborhood residents were
entirely responsible for financing their own schools. Imagine if charters did not
exist and the Philadelphia School District, forced to close under the weight of its
mounting deficit, transformed these Friends of groups into neighborhood quasigovernments that would collect and expend neighborhood taxes on the
neighborhood school. In this case, redistribution to other city schools would
cease and school financing via property taxes would exclusively be a function of
home prices. Those who could afford a neighborhood with a quality school,
would likely find value in such a system knowing that a greater proportion of their
tax dollars are being spent in their own communities. Those who can afford
regional choice might even choose these neighborhoods over suburban
townships.

While economists often tout the efficiency that could be achieved by financing
neighborhood services exclusively by way of neighborhood taxes, such a system
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would have serious consequences for equity96. This thought experiment does
illustrate how the market, if left unchecked could respond to failing neighborhood
schools. It also demonstrates how neighborhood dynamics and laissez-faire
approaches to city planning could lead to the commoditization of education97. No
longer would public schooling constitute even a quasi-public good as wholesale
exclusion would become a reality.

So the question becomes, can planners design a school quality intervention that
harnesses choice, maintains equity and provides middle class households with
value in exchange for their tax dollars? More generally, might it possible to
design an intervention that uses school quality to induce new neighborhood
demand while preventing the displacement of existing residents?

Affordable housing to mitigate the consequences of neighborhood choice

Such a design begins with the understanding that free-riders, as they’re known in
the suburban context, are an integral component of any urban anti-poverty
initiative. Providing the poor with high quality services that they could not
otherwise afford is a key tenant of U.S. housing policy. The stated goal of this
policy is the provision of “a decent home in a suitable living environment for every
American family98.” The framers of this policy recognized the important
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intersection of “housing production and related community development99.”
Intergenerational urban poverty is often characterized by the social and
economic isolation of low-income residents100, thus the theory of mixed-income
neighborhoods holds that to improve the lives of the poor, we have to completely
transform the context in which they live. There are two potential mechanisms for
achieving this transformation – the market-based approach which allows the
invisible hand to reallocate capital across space as it sees it fit and the
government-led approach which alters local housing supply and demand
conditions through government intervention. The market-approach raises
serious concerns for equity – particularly the fear of residential displacement.
Government funded affordable housing may be one way to prevent this fear from
becoming a reality.

The market induces neighborhood change either through changing preferences
for urban living or new investment opportunities in the built environment101. This
“gentrification” process reduces income isolation de facto, by encouraging insorting of higher income residents into a neighborhood. Given the link between
high incomes and home prices, the concern is that gentrification will increase
housing burdens for low-income residents – perhaps leading to their
displacement from the neighborhood. Some have likened the process of
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gentrification to one that transforms cities from 'islands of renewal in seas of
decay' to 'islands of decay in seas of renewal'102.

The literature on gentrification-induced displacement is robust – and its
conclusions may surprise. Identifying displacement is difficult simply because
there is no way to discern, in an absolute sense, gentrified neighborhoods from
non-gentrified neighborhoods. Yet for those who have tried, the results show
that mobility rates from gentrified neighborhoods are comparatively less
pronounced for less-educated, low-income households103. In the face of
increased housing costs, one important conclusion is that low-income residents
in gentrified neighborhoods value the presence of new, positive local amenities
like shops and restaurants – and likely school quality104. There may be some
interesting counterfactual explanations for the lack of displacement evidence.
One, displacement tipping points may exist but are, at the margins,
imperceptible, at least statistically105. In other words, while it may be difficult to
conclude generally that gentrification leads to displacement, there may be
individual cases where it clearly does.

Thus, some measure of government intervention is required in order to ensure
equity and limit displacement in face of new residential demand. Government at
all levels has a history of intervening on both ends of the supply and demand
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spectrum – and it is worth visiting this history, if only to get a sense of which
strategies might help maintain equity within a School Improvement District
framework.

The programs informed by U.S. housing policy exist at intersection of housing
and community development, but the latter has largely taken a back seat to the
former. This is because housing programs, in an effort to maximize the number
of developed affordable housing units, have historically allocated subsidy to the
cheapest land available106. The cheapest land tends to be that which is devoid
of good quality services and amenities107. This supply-side strategy has serious
ramifications - a "spatial bias" that has traditionally allocated housing subsidy to
low-income neighborhoods with poor quality public services and deficient living
environments108. Nevertheless, more than 5 million low-income housing units
have been developed throughout the US109. By any measure, it would be difficult
to conclude that these strategies have succeeded in ending poverty in U.S. cities.

The Housing Act of 1937 allowed local public housing authorities to construct and
maintain housing for low income households and provided a mechanism for slum
clearance – something that would become a mainstay of the housing reformers
agenda for decades to come110. These developments epitomized top-down,
centralized city planning. In many cities, local housing authorities replaced
106
107
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dilapidated slums with high-rise public housing projects that would later become
the face of devastation in primarily African American neighborhoods111. These
“monstrous high-rise edifices isolated low-income occupants by race and social
class and obviated any notion of community112.”

The federal government, still focused on supply-side solutions but reeling from
the disastrous experiment that was public housing, turned to a new program in
the 1990s that sought to replace distressed public housing with mixed-income
housing. Dubbed ‘HOPE VI’, the development of new public housing units
actually served to displace a large number of tenants into neighborhoods of
lesser or equal quality than that of the original housing projects113.

Another contemporary supply-side housing development program is the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, which is a federally mandated,
state administered program that allows non-profits and developers to apply for
tax credits which can be used to offset the costs of affordable rental housing
development. Credits are awarded for projects located in Qualified Census
Tracts (QCT) - those where 50% of households have incomes 60% of the area
median income (AMI). The QCT requirements allocate government subsidy into
neighborhoods with poor quality services. Although at first glance, this rule might
seem detrimental to fostering community development, it might be a valuable tool
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if it were allocated in a low-valued neighborhood that we knew was going to
experience gentrification in the coming years. I return to this point again below.

The federal government has also experimented with demand-side strategies as
well. The basic motivation behind these programs is to use government subsidy
to allow the urban poor to choose better neighborhoods than they could
otherwise afford on their own. Scholars have largely supported the housing
voucher program also known as Section 8, which gives rental vouchers to lowincome households under the assumption that they will redeem them in a
neighborhood with comparatively higher quality public services114. Unfortunately,
evidence suggests that many participants ultimately do not choose better
neighborhoods115. Undeterred by these results, policy makers amended the
voucher program in the 1990s to allow for inter-city renter mobility. They sought
further evidence of mixed-income neighborhood efficacy by engaging in an
experiment, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), modeled on Chicago’s Gatreaux
program. This program randomly allocated low-income families into three
groups116. The first was the experimental group which received vouchers to be
used explicitly in low-poverty neighborhoods; the second was the Section 8
group which received traditional rental vouchers; and a third group (the control
group), received no assistance and typically remained in some form of projectbased assistance. Recent evidence suggests that in fact, transplanting a child
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from a high poverty neighborhood to a low poverty one can have dramatic effects
on the future earnings of that child117. While better school quality is partially at
work here, an evaluation of education outcomes for pre-school aged
experimental participants were not significantly different than their control group
peers118.

To summarize, the goal of U.S. housing policy has been to provide both housing
and community development, yet by all but the most recent measures, the
programs motivated by this policy have not helped our city’s most vulnerable
citizens break away from the yoke of poverty. One idea that often goes
overlooked however, is that randomly allocating individuals to high quality
neighborhoods is fundamentally different than allocating high quality,
neighborhood-sized interventions to low-income individuals119. This might sound
a bit paradoxical, but consider that if individual outcomes are so dependent on
the context in which they were born and grew up, simply transplanting that
individual to a new neighborhood context may not be enough. In other words, we
might observe an entirely different outcome if instead of assigning the urban poor
to a suburban context (including better schools) within which they may feel
alienated, we allocated aspects of the suburban context to the places where the
urban poor live and are familiar with.
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This idea, although not explicitly stated, is the motivation behind a new series of
placed-based interventions laid out by the Obama administration. The
Department of Housing & Urban Development's Choice Neighborhoods Program
is based on the realization that successful housing policy is more than just
maintaining affordability or replacing/upgrading slums. The Choice
Neighborhoods program is more holistic, creating "the conditions necessary for
public and private reinvestment in distressed neighborhoods to offer the kinds of
amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity,
that are important to families' choices about communities120." Alongside new
housing investment, examples of neighborhood improvement include new retail
and transit development; parks urban farms and streetscape programs;
performing arts; healthcare clinics and school improvement121.

In addition, the federal government has realized that school improvement alone
is important enough to warrant its own placed-based program - Promise
Neighborhoods122. Administered by the Department of Education, its vision is to
give students access to "great schools" and "cradle-to-career" solutions toward
"transforming communities123." Promise Neighborhoods is modeled after the
New York City’s Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ). The HCZ is a comprehensive
urban neighborhood and education intervention that combines education
programming from early childhood through high school with after-school, college
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prep, community health programs, family counseling and more124. Researchers
have found that HCZ students perform better than their peers who applied for the
HCZ school lottery but lost125. They conclude, “High quality schools or
community investments coupled with high-quality schools drive these results, but
community investment alone cannot126.” As of yet, there has been no research
on the HCZ and outcomes related to neighborhood economic development.

Given the political polarization that is now commonplace in federal politics, it is
unlikely that these sorts of initiatives could be funded at a national scale.
Further, these programs are not cheap. The budget for one Choice or Promise
Neighborhood implementation grant ranges from $20 to $30 million. The Harlem
Children’s Zone’s budget is roughly $50 million per year127. In addition, there
may be unintended consequences of these placed-based programs particularly if
the goal is to “create the conditions necessary for public and private
reinvestment.” New services and amenities will be capitalized into neighborhood
land prices enriching land owners but likely hurting renters and other low-income
residents who might otherwise benefit from the new services128. If left
unchecked, the unintended consequences of these modern placed-based
government programs may be residential displacement.
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In summary, transplanting suburban-like contexts into downtrodden urban
neighborhoods, particularly high quality education, may be one way to foster
mixed-income neighborhoods and perhaps help lift residents out of poverty. As
demonstrated in Chapter 5, higher-income households will likely exercise their
choice for places with higher quality services like schools which, in the
gentrification context, will require government-lead affordable housing to prevent
residential displacement. Given these realities and the potency of neighborhood
choice to segment people across space, the next and final section introduces a
policy prescription that uses the power of school and neighborhood choice to
finance new school quality and balance growth with equity.

A unifying policy prescription

If changing preferences for urban living is the new norm, then cities like
Philadelphia will almost certainly continue to gentrify. In the face of this reality,
planning should strive to find ways to leverage the gentry’s investment toward
generating spillovers that can lead to more equitable outcomes. To achieve this
requires two related strategies. The first is to harness the power of neighborhood
choice to physically redefine the geographic extent of neighborhoods, the
services they produce and the mix of individuals who consume them. The
second is to realign property taxation and expenditures by ensuring that a greater
percentage of neighborhood taxes go to fund a greater share of neighborhood
services – in this case schools.
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We’ve already discovered that it is neither politically feasible nor equitable to
finance neighborhoods services exclusively with neighborhood taxes. In spite of
this fact, municipalities, in response to perceived gaps between public service
provision and demand for quality public services, have at times, turned to Special
Service Districts (SSD)129. SSDs are placed-based interventions defined by the
Census as "separate entities with substantial administrative and fiscal
independence from general purpose local governments130.” Examples of
services might include watershed and flood control services, utility provision, and
transportation131.

Although many SSD's fund projects by levying additional

property taxes, some are financed by user fees132.

An alternative flavor of SSDs is the Improvement District. Although the legal
framework for Improvement District adoption varies from state to state, they are
generally formed through a local balloting process where approval requires
majority consent from residents for whom additional property taxes would be
assessed. The incremental increase in tax revenues are then used to fund
additional public services. The most ubiquitous form of the Improvement District
is the Business Improvement District (BID). These are typically located in
commercial areas and fund public safety, sanitation, streetscapes, business
marketing and more – all at levels above what municipal governments already
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fund133. Two studies have separately identified 404 and 701 BIDs nationwide
respectively134.

Commercial districts are not the only places where Improvement Districts have
been proposed. Ellickson (1998) suggests "Block Improvement Districts",
because they are comprised of "coterminous informal social networks" that are
"scaled to produce the most localized varieties of public goods". He suggests
that the "block is far too small a unit for provision of a public good that involves
either scale efficiencies or widespread benefits—a service such as elementary
education, a sewer system, or police detective work."

At a higher spatial scale, Pennsylvania has authorized 'Neighborhood
Improvement Districts (NID)135. The State Legislature cites as its rationale that, "
The General Fund revenue derived from taxes many times is not sufficient to
provide adequate municipal services or additional services needed in specific
geographic areas within the municipality136." The act suggests "municipalities
should be encouraged to create, where feasible and desired, assessment-based
neighborhood improvement districts which would include, but not be limited to,
downtown commercial districts." "Designated district management associations
would initiate and administer programs to promote and enhance more attractive
and safer commercial, industrial, residential and mixed-use neighborhoods;
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no central repository for BID-related information.
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economic growth; increased employment opportunities; and improved
commercial, industrial, business districts and business climates."

A Pennsylvania NID requires the consent of at least 60% of District property
owners and allows for the "acquisition, development, construction, improvement,
rehabilitation, operation and/or maintenance of any building," including the use of
eminent domain. In addition, Pennsylvania NID's have the power to issue bonds.
The 60% consent threshold ensures that Improvement Districts are democratic –
if households are not interested in new services, they do not have to vote for the
District. This suggests that the probability of a District winning the consent of the
voting majority is dependent on how the District is drawn. A NID to fund elderly
services in a neighborhood comprised of twenty-somethings is likely to fail. By
contrast, a NID to fund schools in an area predominately comprised of families
with school-aged children might succeed.

Special Service and Improvement Districts don’t just rely on choice to segment
people across space – they plan segmentation explicitly. Researchers have
found a very direct association between Improvement Districts and real estate
prices137, which is not surprising given the willingness of businesses and
households to pay for high quality services. Chapter of 5 of this dissertation finds

137
Ellen et al. (2007) estimate a hedonic price regression comparing in-BID prices with out of BID prices in the same zipcode. They find that commercial property prices increase in very large BIDs but see only marginal gains in smaller BIDs.
Through a very detailed pre and post analysis of voting and real estate transactions in California, Brooks and Strange
(2011) find that larger property owners are more supportive of bid adoption than smaller property owners; that properties
who vote in support of BIDs see higher post-BID adoption price appreciation; and finally that "the collective action of a
BID, while likely a welfare improvement, is not a Pareto improvement."
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that households are willing to pay a premium for high quality schools. In
combination, this evidence suggests that an Improvement District for schools
would successfully foster new neighborhood economic development. What
about equity, however?

The key difference between say, a Business Improvement District which typically
encompasses a homogenous area of the city (i.e. a downtown) and a School
Improvement District, is that the boundaries of the latter would be drawn to
encompass a mixed-income neighborhood. This allows local political leaders to
manipulate the de facto spatial segmentation that results from neighborhood
choice. It also allows gives them the ability to alter the supply of and demand for
public services which could potentially lead to a more equitable income
distribution.

Indeed, Improvement Districts mean tax increases, and although the new tax rate
is flat, the tax is made more progressive by the fact that the tax liability is a
function of home price138. Thus, the tax liability of lower valued homes is less
than that on higher valued homes. Although all in-District residents receive an
equal share of the new school quality, the costs are more equitably distributed.

This framework also helps to ensure a large quantity of affordable housing - at
least initially. There is a distinction here worth noting. By nature, low priced
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Technically, it is a function of a house’s property tax assessment.
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housing is affordable, but if the new services increase the willingness to pay for
in-District housing, we should expect the price of housing to increase as
neighborhood amenities improve. It is for this reason that local political leaders
can bundle a School Improvement District with the development of government
subsidized affordable housing. Of all the programs discussed above, the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit is best suited for this purpose. The Qualified Census
Tract requirements of the LIHTC program require that the subsidy is allocated to
the lower-valued section of a School Improvement District. This would insert
affordable housing today into a neighborhood that could improve in the years to
come. Thus, bundling LIHTC and School Improvement Districts could be a
proactive way to ensure that low-income residents, particularly renters, can
access school improvements even if they cannot afford market prices. There are
additional decision factors related to the potential location of School Improvement
Districts that will be discussed in Chapter 4.

This literature review asked why it is that segmentation and segregation is such a
lasting feature of the urban and regional landscape. Highlighting Philadelphia’s
school reform agenda, including a move to charter schools, helps underscore
how choice can have direct consequences on the economy of neighborhoods.
This relationship is explained by the broader dynamics of neighborhood choice
which, if left unchecked, can relegate the poor to disadvantaged neighborhoods
with low quality public services. While the processes of gentrification and
displacement may shuffle the segmentation tapestry, housing subsidies are
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needed to prevent further isolation of the urban poor. It is then argued that the
power of choice can be harnessed to rewire neighborhoods such that public
service spillovers generated by the wealthy can be leveraged to help the poor.
One solution, it is argued, are Improvement Districts for funding increased school
quality. The innovation that may potentially overcome income segmentation is to
bound the District to include an income diverse neighborhood in order to drive
both growth and equity.
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA & THE PENN
ALEXANDER SCHOOL

Anchor institutions like universities and health care providers (the so-called “Eds.
& Meds”) have, over the last fifteen years, become major players in the urban
economic development realm139. These organizations are often large employers;
procure massive quantities of goods and services from across their regions; own
large swatches of valuable city land and are the major drivers of human capital
development in their respective cities.

In places like Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York, the economic strength of
anchor institutions allowed them to weather the urban decline that chased many
residents and businesses out of cities. In these and other places, anchor
institutions have carried the torch of urban revitalization by capitalizing on the
symbiotic relationship between themselves and their surrounding
neighborhoods140.

The University of Pennsylvania has a long history of planned interventions in
West Philadelphia. In the era of Urban Renewal, Penn leveraged Section 112,
2:1 matching federal grants for real estate acquisition, development and
redevelopment141. Penn’s development activities throughout this time were
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Adams (2003)
Ehlenz & Birch (2014)
Cohen (1998) provides a thorough review of Penn’s redevelopment activities at this time.
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largely improvements to the physical plant, but later, in 1996 when a graduate
student was murdered just off campus, the University had an 'all options on the
table' approach to redevelopment. They could relocate the entire campus to the
suburbs; physically wall itself off from the City or invest its own capital into the
surrounding neighborhood.

Penn chose the latter, announcing the West Philadelphia Initiatives program in
1996. The stated goal of the program was to stimulate neighborhood investment
by focusing on four major components of neighborhood revitalization: Housing,
safety, economic development and schooling142. In partnership with the area’s
other major academic institutions, the University created the not-for-profit
University City District (UCD), whose primary mission continues to be
“community revitalization”, working “within a place-based, data-driven framework
to invest in world-class public spaces, address crime and public safety, bring life
to commercial corridors, connect low-income residents to careers, and promote
job growth and innovation143.” The University also engaged in a widespread real
estate investment program by purchasing and improving both single family and
rental properties and making significant mortgage guarantees to Universityaffiliated borrowers144.
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In 2001, Penn helped finance the construction of the Penn Alexander School
(PAS), a public elementary school, providing the land, $24 million worth of capital
expenditure and an ongoing annual student subsidy of roughly $700,000. The
University also raised additional funding from the William Penn Foundation,
major benefactors and former University president Judith Rodin to fund an
endowment. In partnership with the School District of Philadelphia, the school
opened in two phases, 2001 and 2004. Any student living with the school
catchment boundary (Figure 3.1) is granted admission and in turn the University
provides a $1,330 per pupil subsidy145.
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School District of Philadelphia (2012)
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Figure 3.1: The Penn Alexander School catchment

The school has proven so successful that a January 2012 article from the
Philadelphia Inquirer reported that more than 70 people camped out in line in the
cold for 2 days hoping to register their child for kindergarten. Said one parent,
“The school was the only reason we bought our house"146. In 2013, the
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Hill (2012)
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University changed its admissions rules. No longer does living in the catchment
guarantee a seat in a class – now a lottery process dictates admission147.

According to the Pennsylvania Department of Education, compared to the
Philadelphia school district as a whole, Penn Alexander ranks in the 90th
percentile for attendance. 92% of 5th graders are proficient or better in state
math tests relative to 56% in the district and 76% in the state. 84% of 5th graders
are proficient or better in state reading tests relative to 46% in the district and
67% in the state. Simply put, students at PAS are out performing their peers in
other schools throughout the district and the state and by 2014, test scores had
the school ranked as the top Kindergarten through eighth grade school in
Philadelphia148.

The success of the Penn Alexander School makes it an ideal case for testing
how much home buyers are willing to pay for new school quality where it
previously did not exist. Chapter 5 presents these estimates, concluding that
school-quality driven home price premiums are substantial and that good schools
can drive neighborhood economic development. Indeed Penn’s stated goal for
its school intervention was ‘neighborhood revitalization’, and although they were
successful in stimulating the local economy, they also created a new middleclass choice opportunity in the region. A cursory comparison of Census counts
between 2000 and 2010 for the ten block groups with centroids inside the
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catchment show that although the total population increased 14%, the number of
African Americans declined 43% and the number of Whites increased 48%. With
this sea change in the demographic character of the neighborhood, it should
come as no surprise that many local residents became concerned with Penn’s
ability to induce change and alter the socioeconomic fabric of the
neighborhood149.

From a policy perspective, it is helpful to ask if the Penn Alexander treatment
was Pareto optimal - that is, were all residents made better off and none made
worse off? Clearly, homeowners who were able to sell their homes at a price
which capitalized the school price premium were made better off. Renters, who
saw rent increases however, may have been displaced as a result of the
intervention. Thus, while the University succeeded in creating a neighborhood of
choice, they may have failed to ensure equity.

This conclusion should not come as a surprise however. Not all cities have an
Ivy League university or equivalent private entities with the incentive to invest
millions of dollars into local neighborhoods the way Penn has. Even if they did,
as this case illustrates, investors typically have few incentives to plan for equity.
City elected officials do have this incentive however, and what’s more, they have
a political mandate to provide it as well. The Penn Alexander story should suffice
in convincing elected officials that school quality can help drive neighborhood
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investment. What is needed is both a public financing mechanism and means to
generate equity - precisely what School Improvement Districts are designed to
do.
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Chapter 4: Research Design

This dissertation poses two questions. First, what is the willingness to pay for
good schools in Philadelphia and second, is the School Improvement District
framework economically and politically feasible? If so, what candidate locations
in Philadelphia may be best suited for such interventions? To address these
questions, I engage in four separate but related analyses. The first two address
the first research question, the results of which appear in Chapter 5. The latter
two questions are used to inform a broader analysis and discussion of the School
Improvement District planning process. These results appear in Chapter 6.

Analysis 1 uses a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the willingness
of Philadelphia home buyers to pay for good schools. This analysis pools five
years’ worth of test score and home price data to test the hypothesis that test
scores are capitalized into Philadelphia home prices. However, given that these
estimations are for one point in time, they do not provide useful insights as to
what would happen if a new high quality school were to be introduced where one
previously did not exist, or how neighborhood demand might increase over time
in response. To provide more realistic estimates along these lines, Analysis 2
adopts a similar research design to evaluate the price premiums associated with
the introduction of a new, high quality school – Penn Alexander. These
estimated price premiums allow an estimate of the property tax increase that
could potentially result from a School Improvement District. The results of
analysis 1 & 2 appear in Chapter 5.
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Analysis 3 uses this information alongside a spatial analytical site-suitability
model to engage in a hypothetical School Improvement District planning process
in Philadelphia. A cartographic model is developed within a Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) framework. This model allows an exploration of areas
in Philadelphia where School Improvement Districts may be feasible on an
economic, demographic and political basis. The results of analysis 3 appears in
Chapter 6.

Finally, Analysis 4 augments the analytical results with interviews from key
Philadelphia stakeholders whose experience is directly related to the planning,
operation and financing of School Improvement Districts.

Analysis 1: Estimating the willingness to pay for good schools in
Philadelphia

The purpose of the statistical models described below is to provide an estimate
that can be interpreted as the ‘average increase in home prices associated with a
specified increase in test scores’. Another way to think about this estimation is
that it represents the willingness to pay, on behalf of your average Philadelphia
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home buyer for an increase in public school quality150. As discussed in Chapter
3, researchers have for many years, sought ways to estimate the willingness to
pay for a variety of neighborhood amenities and services. Examples include
includes parks, crime, transit and of course, schools151.

The basic strategy for identifying this willingness to pay is to estimate a statistical
model that decomposes the sale price of a home into the value of its physical
attributes (number of bedrooms, bathrooms, etc.) together with the value of
neighborhood attributes, including local school quality152. An example of this kind
of model is given in Equation 4.1:

(4.1)

log( priceic ) = β 0 + X 'ic β1 + N 'ic β 2 + testScoreic β 3 + ε ic

where the log price of a home sale i in school catchment c is hypothesized to be
a linear function of relevant internal house characteristics (such as the number of
bedrooms and bathrooms, X i = ( x1i ,.., xki ) ; together with a vector of neighborhood
amenities, N i = ( ni1,.., nim ) , (such as distance to crime, parks or transit); and most
importantly, testScorec , reflecting the test score quality in catchment c. All other
influences on the log of price are conveyed in a residual error term, ε ic .

150
Bransington (2009) finds that test scores are among the more important school quality measures valued by home
buyers. Others include expenditures per pupil and pupil/teacher ratio. As such, I use test scores here as a proxy for
school quality.
151
The seminal paper is Kain & Quigley (1970). Examples for parks and green space includes Marancho (2003) and Li
(2010). Example for crime include; Linden (2008) and Troy et al. (2008). Examples in transit include Bowes et al. (2001)
and Mohammed et al (2013). Examples for schooling includes Sonstelie & Portney (1980); Jud & Watts (1981) and
others (see Chapter 2, footnotes 36-39).
152
This flavor of statistical model is commonly referred to as the ‘hedonic’ model. The often-cited seminal paper regarding
the hedonic model is Rosen (1974).
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One shortcoming of Equation 4.1 is that there is no way to measure the extent to
which differences among home prices are influenced by differences in school
outcomes independent of either housing attributes or other neighborhood
amenities. The assumption is that β 3 reflects only the test score effect on home
price with all else being held constant. In reality, good schools are likely
correlated with low crime rates or low instances of housing vacancy which would
bias the school price premium estimate.

It was first realized by Black (1999) that this limitation can be overcome by
exploiting the exogeneity of school catchment boundaries with respect to test
score outcomes. In particular, while the economic fortunes of neighborhoods
may change over time, school catchment boundaries largely remain fixed in
place153.

To explain this innovation, consider the following example. In Philadelphia, the
school catchment area a student lives in determines which public school she
attends. Figure 4.1 illustrates these catchment areas citywide. Suppose that two
homes across the street from one another are separated by a school catchment
boundary. Considering their immediate adjacency, it can be assumed that these
houses are part of the same neighborhood. So by controlling only for differences
in the internal characteristics of each home, all other price differences between
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School attendance boundaries have changed in Philadelphia since the School District was recently forced to close
more than a dozen schools. However, this analysis estimates premiums before the bulk of these schools were closed.
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them can be attributed to catchment area differences (ie. school quality). In
Sandra Black’s words, “the fact that test scores make a discrete jump at
attendance district boundaries while neighborhoods continue to change in a
smooth manner allows me to isolate the relationship between test scores and
house prices.”
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Figure 4.1: Elementary school catchment areas
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This empirical technique is known as a “boundary discontinuity” design, and is a
close cousin of the more well-known “regression discontinuity” design154. The
basic idea is to compare outcomes on either immediate side of a threshold at
which a particular intervention is assigned. The design is quasi-experimental in
nature because it assumes that a household catchment decision is independent
of everything but school quality155

Thus, within the context of the statistical model, we no longer have to control for
the infinite number of possible neighborhood-related drivers of price. Instead, we
form two groups of home sales – those in immediate proximity to one side of the
boundary and another in immediate proximity to opposite side. The basic idea
then, is to relate across-boundary differences in home prices with acrossboundary differences in test scores controlling for the internal characteristics of
homes.

(4.2)

log( priceic ) = β 0 + X 'ic β 1 + Years' ic β 2 + β 2 Bound ' ic β 3 + testScoreic β 4 + ε ic

In 4.2 the vector of neighborhood controls is replaced by a vector of school
catchment boundary fixed effects, Bound ic = [.., b j (ic ),..] 156. In addition, a vector of
year fixed effects, Yearic = [.., y j (ic ),..] 157, allows five years of test score and home
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Thistlethwaite & Campbell (1960); Hahn et al. (2001); Lee & Lemieux (2010)
The “as good as random” assumption may be violated here if the sorting preferences of individuals are non-random –
that is, if Blacks and Whites, for instance, place a heterogeneous premium on “good schools”. See Bayer et al. (2010).
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b j (ic ) = 1 if house ic is closest to boundary b j and is zero otherwise
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Here

157

Here y j ( ic ) = 1 if house sale, ic , occurs in year y j .and is zero otherwise.
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price data to be pooled. Increasing the sample size by including multiple years of
data is an important feature of the model.

Here it is critical to note the importance of how far each home sale observation is
from a given catchment boundary. The goal is to compare home price and test
score differences for homes on either immediate side of the catchment thus
ensuring a robust substitutability of homes used in the sample. Thus Equation
4.2 can be estimated at different distance bandwidths around each boundary in
order to assess how decreasing substitutability might bias the results. The large
sample size allows estimations using five bandwidths at 250ft intervals between
500ft and 1500ft from the boundary158. Figure 4.2 illustrates these distances.

158

To estimate across-boundary differences in her 1999 paper, Black limits her sample to home sales within 0.35, 0.2 and
0.15 miles (approximately 1850, 1050 and 800 feet respectively) of the boundary. She finds that the price premium
associated with an increase in test scores does not change significantly depending on the distance to the boundary.
Using five years of data to estimate 4.2 allows for price differences to be estimated for home within 0.05 miles of the
boundary or roughly 250 feet. To put this in context, it allows for estimations using home sales at within one block of each
catchment boundary. This is an important improvement of the model presented here.
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Figure 4.2: Distances from catchment boundaries
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The model hypothesizes that school quality, as measured by test scores, is a
significant causal driver of home prices in Philadelphia159. If the testScore
coefficient in Equation 4.2 is significantly positive, then this hypothesis is upheld.
Of course, this hypothesis can only be tested if there are enough adjacent
catchment areas with substantially different test scores. If test scores were
largely homogenous citywide, then the boundary approach would be insufficient
for detecting sharp home price discontinuities at the boundaries.

There are some revealing statistics to suggest that schools citywide are of
homogenously low quality. Figure 4.3 maps 3rd grade reading test scores for
each catchment citywide in 2012. According to the most current data from the
Pennsylvania Department of Education, Philadelphia 3rd graders rank 10th out
499 school districts statewide in the percent of students scoring proficient on
state tests. An ever worse statistic reflecting Philadelphia school quality is that
only four Philadelphia schools, Penn Alexander among them, rank among the top
300 in the percent of 3rd grade test takers scoring advanced on reading tests160.

Chapter 5 to investigates the spatial differences in prices when for instance, poor
schools border each other; good schools border poor ones, etc. However, given
that Philadelphia test scores are so low and that so many low score catchments
are adjacent to one another, it is likely that the TestScore coefficient will be
underestimated. This weakness provides motivation for the analysis described

160
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below which estimates school drive price premiums by exploiting a “shock” to the
neighborhood economy – the introduction of a high quality school, Penn
Alexander, where one previously did not exist.
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Figure 4.3: Mean test scores by school catchment: ‘No Data’ refers to non-traditional
public school catchments including neighborhood charters.
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Analysis 2: Home price premiums associated with the Penn Alexander
School

Chapter 3 describes how the Penn Alexander Schools is a clear oasis among
Philadelphia’s vast school quality desert. Not only is it a choice school in the city
but it’s a school of regional and state choice as well. As such, the primary
hypothesis of Analysis 2 is that the introduction of this school was, as the
University intended, a catalyst for neighborhood revitalization, and led to an
increase in neighborhood home prices. The secondary hypothesis is that this
home price premium increased over time as more and more home buyers sorted
into the neighborhood to access the new school amenity.

The research design for Analysis 2 is similar in theory to that of Analysis 1.
Instead of using test scores as an indicator of school quality however, based on
metrics provided in Chapter 3, I assume ex ante that Penn Alexander is a “good
school”, and simply seek to estimate the price premium associated with this
assumption. To give some relative weight to the Penn Alexander price premium,
a group of comparison or control sales are needed. Ideally, these control sales
should be identical to those in the Penn Alexander catchment accept for the fact
that they did not receive the school “treatment”. As was the case in Analysis 1,
the most influential confounding factors here are non-school neighborhood
effects and to control for these, as before, the design assumes that houses on
either side of the catchment boundary are part of the same neighborhood. Thus
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after controlling for the internal characteristics of homes, the Penn Alexander
price premium is simply the average difference between homes immediately
adjacent to the boundary and in the catchment (the treatment group) and those
just on the other side of the boundary but not in the catchment (the control
group). In order to ensure a robust enough sample size, home sales with 1000ft
(roughly 2 blocks) from the catchment are included.

Because Analysis 1 pools five years of test score and price data into one model,
it provides just one price premium estimate – an average across all five years.
The model assumes that although prices may change due to exogenous effects
(like macro changes in the Citywide housing market), the price premium for high
quality schools can be treated as stationary over time. In this case, the Penn
Alexander case however, we consider a nonstationary model in which a new,
high-quality school opens and information about new educational opportunity
slowly resonates throughout the region. This environment allows for the more
realistic possibility that housing demand in the neighborhood increases over time.
To capture these effects, Analysis 2 includes eleven years of home price data
beginning the year before the school opened. In particular, the model estimates
home price trajectories for control and treatment groups over this time period.
The hypotheses is that prices increase faster within the Penn Alexander
treatment group, and thus the price premium increases over time as well.

Equation 4.3 provides the formal model.
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(4.3)

log( pricei ) = β 0 + X 'i β1 + Years'i β 2 + catchi β 3 + catch * Years'i β 4 + ε i

Where the log price of home i is a function of X i , a vector of internal
characteristics; Years'i , a vector of fixed effects representing the year of the sale;
catch * Years'i , an interaction between year fixed effects and a catchment fixed
effect which represents whether home i is inside the Penn Alexander catchment
or not. This is the variable of interest and can be interpreted as the average
price premium associated with a home bought inside of the Penn Alexander
catchment in a given year, relative to the baseline year and the control group. In
other words, these coefficients represent the average willingness to pay for a
home with Penn Alexander access in a given year. Finally, ε i is a residual error
term, which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed.

If the year by catchment fixed effects are statistically significant, the estimations
they yield will help inform School Improvement District planning process because
they represent how demand for the new amenity increases over time. It also
helps us to understand, unlike Analysis 1, how much home buyers are willing to
pay for a high quality school in an area where one previously did not exist.
Finally, the analysis provides the opportunity for cost/benefit calculations. From
a planning perspective, this understanding might help inform how much new
economic activity a School Improvement District might generate given some
amount of up-front investment. This is especially important particularly if the
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program asks households to voluntarily increase their own taxes to fund new
school quality.

These estimations along with those from Analysis 1 will be used for the School
Improvement District feasibility study. As discussed at length in Chapter 2, while
home price appreciation and neighborhood revitalization are an important part of
the School Improvement District – a successful feasibility study will hinge on
whether Districts can plan for equity in the face of expected real estate
appreciation.

Analysis 3: Planning School Improvement Districts

This section describes a potential methodology Philadelphia could use to assess
School Improvement District feasibility by way of a Geographic Information
System (GIS)-based, land-use site suitability model161. The basic workflow is to
create spatial “decision factors” and then overlay them atop each other to create
a ‘site suitability index’. This yields a suitability score for each school catchment
area citywide. Narrowing the search to only the most suitable catchments, it then
becomes possible to estimate how much additional tax revenue/burden would be
generated if a School Improvement District was created.
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These methods are reviewed in Malczewski (2004).
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The suitability analysis considers decisions factors that will likely lead to a
positive electoral outcome for the District as well as ensuring economic and
equitable development outcomes. Each factor is encoded as a raster map – a
cartographic representation not unlike a weather map where data is represented
by an array of pixels or grid cells. Individual factors are scaled such that each
runs from 1-10 where a value of ‘10’ represents highest suitability. This
framework allows us to compare or overlay say, neighborhood income encoded
in dollars with the supply of local vacant land encoded in units of density. The
scaling process allows for the possibility that planners may wish to weigh certain
factors more than others while also ensuring that the final site suitability index is
not skewed by any one decision factor. Figure 4.4 illustrates the weighted
overlay technique.

Figure 4.4: The weighted overlay technique.

Chapter 3 suggests planners can foster equity by redefining neighborhood
boundaries and with them the supply of and demand for public services –
services like education. Creating entirely new school catchment “neighborhoods”
is beyond the scope of this analysis, thus existing school catchment boundaries
are used. A map of catchments are overlaid atop the final site suitability index
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and the average suitability score is calculated for each catchment. Finally, the
highest scoring catchments (defined as 5th quintile average suitability score) are
used to estimate the amount of tax revenues/burdens that could be generated if
we assume a School Improvement District raised residential property tax rates.
The next section describes the motivation behind the individual decision factors
used for this analysis.

Decision factors

The majority of the decision factors included in the analysis deal with equity.
Chapter 3 suggests that a growth/equity balance can be achieved if planners
either choose an income diverse area or actually manipulate the spatial bounds
of a neighborhood in order to control the supply of and demand for public
services. The implications of drawing School Improvement District boundaries to
include a mixed-income neighborhood extend to education achievement as well.

Research presented in Technical Appendix 1 asks whether there is a statistically
significant relationship between the number of students scoring proficient or
advanced on math and reading test scores and racial diversity at the school
level162. The statistical models estimated in Technical Appendix 1 are robust,
and conclude that a 10% increase in racial diversity, leads to roughly a 1.7% 2% increase in the number of students who score proficient or advanced on

162

The analysis controls for other non-student neighborhood and school effects
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standardized tests163. These results suggest that planning a diverse School
Improvement District is not only a good idea from an equity standpoint but from
education productivity standpoint as well.

Decision
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Name
Encoding Description
Diversity
Diversity index by block group
Lag of Diversity
Mean of Diversity index by block group and its first order adjacent neighbors
Middle Income
Diversity of income deciles by block group
Lag of Income
Mean of Income by block group and its first order adjacent neighbors
Middle Sale Price
Forth through sixth family home sale price deciles by block groupt
St. Dev. Sale Price Standard Deviation of single family home sale prices by block group
Lag of Sale Price
Mean of home price by block group and its first order adjacent neighbors
Qualifed Census TractQualified census tract designation by tract
Vacant Land
Kernel density of vacant land
LIHTC
Count of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Units by block group
CDCs
Distance to nearest neighborhood Community Development Corp.
Elementary Schools Distance to nearest elementary school
Children Under Age 9 Count of children under age 9 by block group

Scale
1-10
1-10
1 & 10
1-10
1 & 10
1-10
1-10
1 & 10
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-10

Source
Census
Census
Census
Census
OpenDataPhilly
OpenDataPhilly
OpenDataPhilly
HUD
PWD**
HUD
PACDC*
OpenDataPhilly
Census

* Philadelphia Association of Community Development Corporations
** Philadelphia Water Department

Table 4.1: Decision Factors

Each decision factor is summarized in table 4.1 above. Decision factors 1-7 aim
to capture racial and economic diversity at the neighborhood level. Decision
factor 1 is a racial ‘diversity index’ calculated at the Census block group level164.
This index can be used not only to analyze how many Whites are in an area, but
how the proportion of Whites compares with the proportion of other races as well.
Decision factor 2 tries to get a sense of diversity not only for each individual block
group but for each block group and its adjacent neighboring block groups. This
is referred to as the ‘spatial lag’ of diversity.

163
164

These estimations should not be construed as causal in nature. More information is provided in Technical Appendix 1.
More info on how the Diversity Index is calculated can be found in Technical Appendix 1.
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Decision factor 3 is concerned with income diversity. Ideally, we would have
data on actual income breakdowns by block group so that we could calculate
income diversity much like race above. In lieu of these data, decision factor 3 is
concerned with middle income (4th-6th deciles) block groups and decision factor 4
takes the spatial lag of median household income.

The next three decision factors use single-family home sale prices as proxy for
economic diversity. Decision factor 5 indicates middle priced neighborhoods (4th6th deciles); decision factor 6 is the lag of sale prices; and decision factor 7 is the
standard deviation of home sale prices by block group. This last factor gives a
good indication of whether a neighborhood is contains economic diversity or not.

Chapter 2 discussed the importance of affordable housing development,
particularly the use of Low Income Housing Tax Credits which allocates housing
subsidy to high poverty neighborhoods. These ‘Qualified Census Tracts’ (QCT),
are tracts where 50% of households have incomes 60% of the area median
income. Decision factor 8 includes areas that are inside QCTs or immediately
adjacent to them.

Low Income Housing Tax Credits cannot be used to cover land acquisition
costs165, thus developers of tax credit housing, typically local community
development non-profits, rely on the stock of vacant land. Philadelphia has an

165

Schwartz (2006).
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abundance of vacant land166. As ownership of land is a prerequisite when
applying for tax credits, decision factor 9 describes the density of vacant land
parcels throughout Philadelphia. To get a sense of where existing affordable
housing opportunities exist, decision factor 10 describes the current stock of Low
Income Housing Tax Credits units in Philadelphia

While land acquisition is important, of equal if not greater importance is the
institutional knowledge required to put together a tax credit application – the
“Qualified Allocation Plan”. There are a handful of community non-profits in
Philadelphia, many of which are neighborhood-based, that have a proven track
record of successfully competing for tax credits. While partnering with one of
these groups is important for the development of affordable housing, it is also
vital for administrative purposes as well. Consider that a well-funded and wellmanaged community non-profit has the experience and know-how to manage
projects at the neighborhood as well as organize and advocate on the behalf of
local residents. An Improvement District is a non-profit entity that requires a
small administrative staff. It is in the best interest of the District to minimize
administrative overhead by partnering with an existing non-profit to help reduce
these costs. As such, decision factor 11 considers the spatial location of
community development non-profits in Philadelphia.

166

By some estimates this stock includes 40,000 land parcels throughout Philadelphia (City of Philadelphia, 2014).
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Decision factor 12 is about locating an appropriate school facility. Although it
may be feasible to float a bond toward the construction of a new school, the
preferred option is the adaptive reuse of an existing school facility. Decision
factor 12 encodes the distance to the nearest elementary school.

Finally, according to Pennsylvania's Neighborhood Improvement District
legislation any proposed School Improvement District requires the consent of at
least 60% of area property owners. The suggests that proposed District
boundaries must include residents who are likely to vote for the legislation – in
this case, families with school-aged children (Decision factor 13) – defined as the
number of households with children under 9 years old. Residents who do not fit
this demographic profile are not likely to vote for a tax increase from which they
receive no benefit.

The last step uses parcel level tax assessment data to estimate how much
revenues could be raised if the School Improvement District imposed a property
tax increase of 0.25% moving rates from 1.34% to 1.59%. This analysis shows
the amount of new funds that could be raised for school improvement in total and
the average additional tax burden for families living in a potential District.

Analysis 4: Interviews with experts
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Although the site-suitability analysis is critical to the planning process, there are
other important considerations that cannot be quantified. This section outlines
three interviews conducted with professionals whose experience is relevant for
planning School Improvement Districts167. A brief introduction is provided for
each interviewee which is then followed by a list of questions. Appendix 2 is a
School Improvement District policy brief that was sent out to each interviewee.
Appendix 3 includes the specific questions asked to each interviewee.

Paul Levy, President & CEO, Center City District Philadelphia

The Center City District is a non-profit Business Improvement District
representing Philadelphia’s central business district. Its revenues topped $20
million in 2013. Their expenditures range from streetscaping and public safety to
marketing and research168. They are currently servicing a $21 million bond, part
of which is being used to finance Dilworth Park – a new, 120,000 square foot
park bordering City Hall in the heart of downtown Philadelphia. This organization
is widely regarded as one of the largest and most comprehensive Business
Improvement Districts in the world169 - and Paul Levy is at the helm. There are
likely few other experts anywhere in the U.S. who can speak better to the
financing and administrative requirements of School Improvement Districts.

167
168
169

Interviews were requested from four individuals but only three responded.
Center City District (2013)
Morcol (2010).
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Dennis Culhane, Professor, Penn School of Social Work

As discussed in Chapter 3, the University of Pennsylvania conducted a largescale planning process for its West Philadelphia Initiatives program. To assess
the feasibility of a number of placed-based interventions including the Penn
Alexander School, The Cartographic Modeling Lab led by Professor Dennis
Culhane used data and analytics to predict the potential housing demand for the
new school. This interview discusses this planning process including strengths
and weaknesses. In addition, given the school’s success as a catalyst for
neighborhood change, the interview will also ask if Professor Culhane could do it
again, would he reformulate the plan to include additional equity.

Ivy Olesh, President of the Friends of Chester Arthur

Ivy Olesh is the president of one of the foremost “Friends of” groups in
Philadelphia. The Friends of Chester Arthur is a non-profit “committed to
partnering with the staff, teachers and students (of Chester Arthur)…in order to
foster a robust learning environment for neighborhood children170.” This
interview will focus on why these “Friends of” groups have proliferated in recent
years and why neighborhood residents are willing to donate to their local school.

170

Friends of Chester Arthur (2014).
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Kira Strong, Vice President of Community and Economic Development, People’s
Emergency Center (PEC)

PEC is a community development non-profit located in the Mantua section of
Philadelphia and Kira Strong is their Vice President of Community and Economic
Development. PEC’s service area makes it unique among Philadelphia’s many
community developers. While one in four housing units are vacant in Mantua
and 98% of students at the local elementary school are designated lowincome171, its neighbor, Drexel University has been a catalyst for gentrification in
recent years. In the summer of 2014, Drexel announced that it plans to open a
new public school which would serve Mantua in part. For these reasons, PEC
will emerge as a unique case study for how to plan for equity in the midst of
growth. Questions for Kira Strong deal exclusively with how affordable housing
provision might make a real difference in the lives of local residents and school
children in particular.

This chapter introduced a comprehensive research design for estimating the
willingness to pay for school quality in Philadelphia and how to harness this
dynamic to plan School Improvement Districts. Chapters 5 and 6 present and
discuss the results of these research questions.

171

Kilpatrick (2014).
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CHAPTER 5: ESTIMATING THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR GOOD
SCHOOLS

Analysis 1: Estimating the willingness to pay for good schools in
Philadelphia

The objective of this analysis is that school quality as measured by test scores is
a significant driver of home prices. The research design suggests that this
should be reflected as sharp discontinuities in home prices and test scores
across school catchment boundaries.

Before testing this hypothesis, it is useful to see if these patterns can be
visualized. To do so, a visualization is presented that (i) groups all home sales
by their nearest boundaries; (ii) groups sales once again by whether they are on
the “high” or “low” test score side of the boundary172; and lastly, (iii) averages
sale prices over all “low-side” and “high-side” groups. These two averages are
visualized in Figure 5.1 below - the average difference between high and low
side prices is roughly $10,000173

This average price difference may be small in instances where “high” and “low”
test scores are actually reflecting two relatively low test score school catchments

172
These data include all years, adjusted for inflation. Only catchment boundaries with test scores on either side are
included.
173
Of course, in this form, additional controls are not included.
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abutting one another. To identify more interesting across-catchment differences,
sales are further decomposed into test score quartiles as seen in Figure 5.2.
Note column 4 displays price differences in instances where sale prices in first
quartile test score catchments are directly compared to those in the fourth
quartile. Compare these results to column 1 which illustrates price differences
when two first quartile catchments abut one another. More generally, Figure 5.2
shows that as quartile differences in test scores increase so do average price
differences.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the possibility that comparatively low test scores
differences on either side of catchment boundaries may depress the estimated
home price effect from Equation 4.2.
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Figure 5.1: Home price differences for observations on either the high or low test score
side of a catchment boundary.
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Figure 5.2: Home price differences for observations on either the high or low test score side of a catchment boundary broken
out by test score quartiles.
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Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the entire dataset. Unfortunately,
Philadelphia assessor data is unreliable when it comes to hedonic variables like
number of bedrooms, bathrooms and other measures of home quality. Thus, it’s
best to think of the below results not as ‘quality-adjusted’ but ‘size-adjusted’
estimations. Table 5.2 presents the results estimated from the model in
expression 4.2. Each column represents a separate regression on subsets of
observations for different distance bandwidths around the catchment boundary.
Again, the assumption is that by restricting the regression to observations closer
to the catchment boundary, one can separate test score effects from other nonschool amenity effects.

Although catchment boundaries allow the model to account for spatial variation at
very small spatial scales, it is possible that significance levels are being overinflated due to spatial autocorrelation. Because memory allocation in standard
statistical packages will not allow for the estimation of spatial regression and
associated models with such large sample sizes and so many fixed effects, I rely
on clustered standard errors (CSE) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The motivation for
CSE is very similar to that of spatial autoregressive models in that it corrects for
otherwise biased standard errors in instances where the data share hierarchical
spatial dependencies.
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Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Sale Year

72,518

2009.881

1.42

2,008

2,011

Sale Price

72,518

124,949.50

207,500.60

1,000

30,000,000

Frontage

72,518

2,146.11

19,333.81

0

4,937,200

Depth

72,518

8,122.15

9,183.73

0

1,031,700

Garage Dummy

72,518

0.362

0.481

0

1

Total Liveable Area

72,518

1,313.53

1,156.08

0

272,160

Reading Test Score

72,518

1,259.03

64.646

1,112

1,464

Table 5.1: Summary statistics.

‘Reading test score’ is the variable of interest. It is interpreted as the average
home price premium associated with a specified increase in test scores. This
coefficient increases dramatically as observations farther from the catchment
boundary are included. In fact, the price premium nearly doubles between the
500ft and the 1500ft regressions. There are two reasons for this outcome and
both are related to the fact test scores are the only reflection of catchment level
variation in the model. First, referring to Figure 4.2, consider that homes 1500
feet from the boundary are practically in the center of the school catchment which
means that the model is picking up effects that may have nothing to with
catchment boundaries. Second, consider how prices may differ for homes
immediately adjacent to the boundary compared to homes each 1500 feet from
the boundary – homes which may effectively be in two different neighborhoods.

For the 500ft bandwidth, the model estimates the following relationships: First,
after controlling for housing attributes, years and catchment effects, school
quality as measured by test scores has a statistically significant effect on home
prices. Second, the results estimate that a 100 point increase in test scores is
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expected to lead to a 4.58% increase in home prices which is $5,888 at the 2012
mean home price of $126,644. To put it another way, a one standard deviation
shift in test scores – roughly 63 points in 2012, leads to a or 2.89% increase in
home prices $3,660 increase in home prices at the 2012 mean.

While there is of course a degree of uncertainty in these results, the 95%
confidence bounds on this estimation suggest that the price premium could be as
low as $5,262 or as high as $14,459 at the 2012 mean. This relatively high
upper bound suggests that homes in higher in higher quality school catchments
can fetch a significantly higher home price premium.

Finally, it should be noted that results for individual boundary effects have not be
included in Table 5.2. Not only are they too numerous to list, but more
importantly, their individual interpretations are not useful given our present
research question. However, from a spatial point of view, it is of interest to
examine the pattern of statistically significant boundary effects – where jumps in
housing prices are most substantial. To do so, each catchment boundary which
is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) has been highlighted in Figure 5.3
below. Here the black lines represent statistically significant boundaries. The
northern boundary of the Penn Alexander catchment is a commercial corridor,
and because of a reduced sample of home sales along that boundary, the model
finds it statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level.
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Dependent variable: log of sale price
Total Liveable Area

Frontage

500ft

750ft

1000ft

1250ft

0.0000298

0.0000411

0.0000477

0.0000531

0.0000573

0.0000263

0.0000353

0.0000395

0.0000435

0.0000465

0.0000003

0

0.00000003

0.0000001

0.0000001

0.000001

0.0000001

0.0000001

0.0000001

0.0000002

0.0000041*
0.0000023

Depth

1500ft

0.0000031** 0.0000031*** 0.0000031*** 0.0000033***
0.0000013
0.0000011
0.0000011
0.0000011

Garage Dummy

0.2065105*** 0.1998242*** 0.1969910*** 0.1929513*** 0.1907499***
0.0316825
0.0302367
0.027058
0.0259327
0.0259275

Sale Year (2009)

-0.1124482*** -0.1119023*** -0.1174749*** -0.1126425*** -0.1097761***
0.0166661

Sale Year (2010)

Observations
2

R

2

Adjusted R

Residual Std. Error

0.0114842

0.0167677

0.0159088

0.0155872

0.015719

0.0208581

0.0221583

0.0209677

0.0223901

-0.0979924*** -0.1017292*** -0.1040960*** -0.1073044*** -0.1094640***
0.0315415

Reading Test Score

0.0116743

-0.1110404*** -0.1268929*** -0.1271880*** -0.1264679*** -0.1228530***
0.0233449

Sale Year (2012)

0.0120855

-0.1017444*** -0.1076550*** -0.1167053*** -0.1174039*** -0.1179258***
0.0201808

Sale Year (2011)

0.0134783

0.0004576**

0.0284266

0.0265719

0.0248543

0.0253191

0.0005774** 0.0007021*** 0.0007867*** 0.0008605***

0.0002153

0.0002511

0.0002614

0.0002662

0.0002712

33,099

46,052

55,847

61,872

65,831

0.5255314

0.5204444

0.5210495

0.5194824

0.517392

0.519301

0.5157547

0.5171502

0.5159541

0.5140629

0.9204207

0.918482

0.9111492

0.9050261

0.9030642

Significance codes: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1
Exterior condition fixed effects are omitted for space. Standard errors are reported below coefficients. The 'felm' R package used to
estimate this regression does not report an intercept. This package is expressly designed to estimate regressions with many fixed effects –
hence its use. Estimates are reported for clustered standard errors (CSE) at the neighborhood level. When the same model is estimated
without CSE, the total livable area variable is reported as significant at the 0.05 level. The non-significance here may have to do with
historical development patterns - that is, if neighborhoods segment home types in to homogenous groups clustering standard errors in this
way should decrease their overall statistical significance.

Table 5.2: Results estimated from the model in Equation 4.2
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Figure 5.3: Statistically significant boundary fixed effects overlaid on mean test scores.
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How do these results compare to other studies that have employed the same
method? Table 5.3 adopts a table from Black & Machin (2009), to show the
results for four different cities around the world. The results in Philadelphia are
similar to those elsewhere, although it should be emphasized that the
Philadelphia estimations are likely less bias in the sense that the model is
estimated from observations within 500ft of the boundary. Black (1999) uses
observations within roughly 1,850 ft. of the boundary while Davidoff & Leigh
(2008) use observations within nearly 3000 feet. As previously mentioned, Table
5.1 shows how volatile these estimates can be at distances beyond the
immediate catchment boundary.

Author
Black (1999)
Davidoff & Leigh (2008)
Fiva & Kikeboen (2008)
Fack & Grenet (2010)

Location
Boston, MA
Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Oslo, Norway
Paris, France

Result
A 1 SD increase in school quality leads
A 1 SD increase in school quality leads
A 1 SD increase in school quality leads
A 1 SD increase in school quality leads

to a 5% increase in prices.
to a 3.5% increase in prices.
to a 1.5% increase in prices.
to a 2% increase in prices.

Table 5.3: Findings from other papers using similar research designs.

The present analysis shows that there is a significant willingness to pay for
quality schools in Philadelphia. Although the model includes five years of test
score and price data, the estimates are still cross-sectional in nature - which is to
say that the model provides little insight in to how price premiums may have
adjusted to the Philadelphia School District’s decline. Figure 5.4 shows the
pairwise regressions between mean single family home sale prices and mean 3rd
grade reading test scores over the five years included in the analysis. The
increasing R-Squared values suggest that the price/test score relationship is
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becoming sharper as more schools close and wealthier home buyers bid up
prices in the few neighborhoods where good schools remain.

As previously mentioned, willingness to pay for quality schooling as estimated in
the above analysis is likely biased downward by the overall poor quality of
schools Citywide. In other words, the potentially significant price premiums
associated with the City’s “best” schools may be overwhelmed by the relatively
low average premiums across the entire City. Thus an alternative approach to
estimating the price premiums associated with good schools would be to observe
changes in home prices when a neighborhood is “shocked” by the introduction of
a very high quality school. Penn Alexander is widely regarded by housing
consumers to be such a school, and motivates our analysis of this case below.
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Figure 5.4: Pairwise test score/home price regressions, 2008-2012

Analysis 2: Estimating the willingness to pay for the Penn Alexander
School

The research design used to estimate the willingness to pay for the Penn
Alexander School is similar in spirit to the one used to derive estimates Citywide.
The difference is that unlike the Citywide case, this analysis provides an
opportunity to understand how the housing market responds to the introduction of
a good school where one previously did not exist. This method is deemed to be
more relevant for the financing and implementation of School Improvement
Districts.
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As in the Citywide case, it is the school catchment boundary that provides the
means by which causal effects can be identified. This boundary is not simply an
historical artifact of household demand, nor a pre-existing attendance boundary
that has been in place for several decades. Rather, it represents a planned
intervention that once enacted, proceeded to change the way in which
households interacted with their community. In the year before the school
opened, students on either side of the catchment boundary did not go to
separate schools. Then suddenly, with the opening of Penn Alexander, students
on one side of the boundary were permitted to attend the new Universitysubsidized elementary school while their peers across the street were forced to
remain at their previous institution.

By visualizing the spatial and temporal pattern of home sale prices over time with
respect to this catchment boundary, we can begin to see how it has become a
significant dividing line between neighbors. Figure 5.5 traces the annual
movement of inflation-adjusted mean price per square foot of homes inside and
outside of the Penn Alexander catchment by year. Note that initially there is little
difference between prices prior to the school's construction in the year 2000.
However, while the overall trend for all prices throughout the study period is
upward, prices inside of the catchment increased at a faster rate than those just
outside. More over, the continued separation of the two lines over time serves to
underscore the strong effect that school’s introduction had on the local housing
market.
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Figure 5.6 plots inflation adjusted home sale prices as a function of distance to
the catchment boundary by year (negative distances are outside of the
catchment and positive distances are inside. Each line represents associated
regressions of prices on distances for each year. Here again, we see that prices
on either side of the boundary were roughly similar before the school opened, but
diverged dramatically in subsequent years. Notice that prices on either side of
the boundary were roughly the same before and in the year the school opened.
In the immediate years to follow however, prices diverged dramatically.

Figure 5.5: Mean price per square foot of home inside and outside the Penn Alexander
catchment. Error bars represent the standard error around the mean price per square foot.
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Figure 5.6: Inflation adjusted home prices as a function of distance to the Penn Alexander
catchment by year

Table 5.4 displays the summary statistics for the data used in the regression
portion of this analysis.

Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Sale Year

1,070

2,005.09

3.184

2,000

2,011

Sale Price

1,070

246,452.00

173,077.30

1120

1,190,000

Frontage

1,070

2,005.86

816.336

1,200

11,000

Depth

1,070

9,404.91

2,467.89

2,200

20,800

Garage Dummy

1,070

0.255

0.438

0

2

Total Liveable Area
Distance to
Catchment Boundary

1,070

2,062.26

764.62

0

6,857

1,070

524.365

299.66

33.31

1,068.49

Table 5.4: Home prices as a function of distance to the Penn Alexander catchment by year
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Table 5.5 presents the results of the regression described in Equation 4.3. The
variables of greatest interest are the year by catchment interaction effects which
are interpreted as the average price premium associated with a home purchased
inside of the Penn Alexander catchment in a given year, relative to the baseline
year and the control group – where the baseline year is 2000 (a year before the
school opened) and the control group includes those homes immediately outside
of the catchment.

Column 1 of Table 5.5 shows that in 2001, the year the school opened, there was
little statistical difference in (non-transformed) prices on either side of the
catchment relative to prices in 2000 – a year before the school opened. From
2002 onward, all year-by-catchment effects are statistically significant. By 2011,
on average, the Penn Alexander price premium is estimated to be on average,
more than $132,000 – a statistically significant result that constitutes more than
30% of the average in-catchment home price.

The estimated price premiums are shown in Figure 5.7 along with their 95%
confidence intervals. While the interval widths are substantial, the degree of
uncertainty may reflect the lack of individual housing attribute data used in the
study. Nevertheless, the overall trend in these results is still apparent. Many of
the year by catchment interactions using the log transformed prices lack
statistical significance, but the 2011 coefficient suggests on average, a home
inside the catchment sells for more than 48% than its neighbor outside the
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catchment. It also worth mentioning that while the larger U.S. housing market
suffered dramatically in 2008, prices quickly leveled out in the Penn Alexander
catchment suggesting that their may be a connection between quality education
amenities and price resiliency.

Figure 5.7: Non-transformed annual price premium estimations and their 95% confidence
intervals
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Dependent variable: sale price
No
Log
Transformation Transformation
Total Liveable Area
86.92***
0.0005399***
15.17548
0.00016
Frontage

24.52***
9.45222

0.00008
0.00007

Depth

5.82**
2.56762

0.0000673*
0.00003

Garage Dummy

43,417***
16254.00000

0.4193685***
0.10188

2001 * catch

12981.25000
15465.30000

0.4398805*
0.25739

2002 * catch

77,300***
20766.57000

0.5969798***
0.20437

2003 * catch

64,154***
20066.06000

0.5641461**
0.24330

2004 * catch

81,074**
41160.55000

0.6010603***
0.22108

2005 * catch

106,681***
32485.82000

0.4273816**
0.21338

2006 * catch

96,428***
34437.55000

0.4784539**
0.23726

2007 * catch

194,387***
25904.33000

0.7334490***
0.25656

2008 * catch

125,6550***
39012.31000

-0.22402
0.56649

2009 * catch

130,505***
32993.26000

0.5346393**
0.26974

2010 * catch

142,658***
20695.29000

0.7338199**
0.29358

132,366***
19814.61000
1,065
Observations
2
0.55
R
2
0.53
Adjusted R
117876
Residual Std. Error
Significance codes: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1

0.3924133**
0.18635
1,065
0.4
0.39
0.912179

2011 * catch

Estimates are reported for clustered standard errors (CSE) at the tract level. Exterior condition and individual year fixed
effects are omitted for space. Year * catch represents an interaction between year & catchment fixed effects. Standard
errors reported below coefficients. The 'felm' package used to estimate this regression does not report an intercept.

Table 5.5: Results of the regression described in Equation 4.3
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These findings suggest that despite the Philadelphia School District’s ongoing
fiscal hardship, households are still willing to pay a significant premium for
housing in quality school catchments. These results are likely driven by
household preferences for quality schools and the unique agglomeration benefits
associated with living in a city like Philadelphia. Thus, it is possible that
households from across the region are sorting into to the City to consume
agglomeration benefits while subsequently bidding up prices for houses in the
few quality school catchments that remain.

The economic development implications of these results cannot be understated.
As discussed in Chapter 3, The University of Pennsylvania spent $24 million on
capital construction costs. In addition, Penn provides a $1,330 subsidy for each
one of their approximately 500 students. Although the school opened in two
phases, 2001 and 2004, assuming that the subsidy included all 500 students
from 2001 to 2011, then Penn spent $665,000 per year and $7.315 million
throughout the study period. Combined with the costs for construction, the total
cost of the school intervention was $31.315 million.

There are 681 single family homes in the PAS catchment area. Multiplied by the
2011 price premium estimate of roughly $132,000 yields nearly a $90 million
dollar benefit to the single-family home market (these numbers would be higher if
the rental market was included). According to this back-of-the-envelope
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cost/benefit comparison, the estimated total benefit of the school tripled the
University’s costs.

This result suggests that perhaps policy makers may have overlooked school
quality as an economic development mechanism in disinvested urban
communities. Chapter 6 uses these results as the primary motivation for School
Improvement Districts.
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CHAPTER 6: PLANNING SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS

This chapter discusses how planners could successfully plan School
Improvement Districts. There are two sections. The first is a largely data-driven
process that involves the creation of cartographic decision factors which when
overlaid generate a site suitability index. This index is then used to identify the
economic viability of School Improvement Districts across existing school
catchments. The second section further informs the planning process compiling
and expounding on responses from local experts with experience managing
organizations similar to School Improvement Districts.

Data driven

To begin, the decision factors outlined in Chapter 4 are each compiled and
encoded as vector shapefiles. Figure 6.1 visualizes these decision factors. Most
are derived from Census block groups and contain continuous values. Examples
include decision factor 1 (the Diversity Index) and decision factor 13 (the count of
children under the age of 9). Other factors like the Qualified Census Tracts are
encoded with binary values – either a tract is “qualified” or not. Finally, two
decision factors are created from point geographies – Neighborhood CDC’s and
Elementary Schools.
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In order to enable the weighted overlay procedure, these vector decision factors
are then encoded as raster maps. These maps are displayed in Figure 6.2.
Many of the variables that originated from block groups still resemble their vector
appearance. Note however that the point decision factors such as Neighborhood
CDC’s and Elementary Schools are encoded so that every location on the map is
represented by its distance to the nearest point (e.g. elementary school).

Each raster decision factor shares the following qualities: (i) all have the same
number of pixels; (ii) all pixels share the same length and width dimensions; and
(iii) all factors have values that range from ‘1’ through ‘10’. This framework
allows the set of decision factors to be perfectly overlaid atop one another and to
perform simple mathematical operations on the entire “stack” of decision factors.
In order to calculate the site suitability index, the following equation is used:
Site suitability index = Diversity + Lag of Diversity + St. Dev. Sale Price + Lag of Sale Price +
CDCs + LIHTC + Elementary Schools + Vacant Land + (Children Under Age 9 * 2) + (Middle Sale
Price * 2) + (Middle Income * 2)

In this example, three decision factors are weighted with twice as much influence
as the other ten. Weighting schemes can be left to the analyst’s discretion – as it
is here. Or, given the flexible nature of this analysis, it’s often useful to take this
technology in front of a group of community stakeholders who can weigh the
factors as they see fit, visualize the resulting suitability index and then reiterate.
The results from the site suitability index calculate from the above equation are
shown in Figure 6.3, along with the mean suitability score by school catchment.
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Figure 6.1: Site suitability decision factors in vector GIS form
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Figure 6.2: Site suitability decision factors in raster GIS form
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Figure 6.3: Final site suitability index and mean index by school catchment
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The final site suitability analysis suggests that the low/medium scoring areas
include Philadelphia’s central business district, the University City neighborhood
(where the Penn Alexander School is located) and other more wealthy sections
of the city in the northwest and northeast. Figure 6.4 shows the top quintile
school catchments with respect to their site suitability score.

Figure 6.4: Most suitable school catchments (5th Quintile)
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Once the most suitable areas have been delineated, the City’s tax assessment
data can be used to calculate how much additional tax revenue can be expected
from a School Improvement District in a given catchment, and how much of an
increased tax burden this might mean for local homeowners. In this scenario, we
assume that the School Improvement District brings with it an additional millage
of 0.25%, increasing the real estate tax rate from 1.35% to 1.59%. Tax
assessment data is publically available in Philadelphia, and it includes assessed
values for all residential properties Citywide. These data were joined to the
school catchments and used to calculate the statistics shown in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Estimated new tax revenues/burdens generated from most suitable school
catchments (5th Quintile)
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The column labeled ‘Total Difference in Rateables Btwn. 1.34% and 1.59%’ gives
an estimate of how much new property tax revenue could be generated for
District use. While these numbers range dramatically, a useful benchmark is
provided by the Penn Alexander case, where the University of Pennsylvania
contributes $1,330 for each of the Penn Alexander School’s students. This
means that the school is able to raise an additional $665,000 annually. Table 6.1
shows that 9 of the 34 schools listed could potentially raise that much in the way
of new funds in its first year of operation. These results suggest that within the
context of the present analysis, School Improvement Districts are at least
economically feasible in Philadelphia.

The column labeled ‘Total per Household Difference in Rateables Btwn. 1.34%
and 1.59%’ provides an estimate of the average per household tax burden
increase. Recall that one of the key factors involved in the planning of School
Improvement Districts is that they would straddle lower and middle income
neighborhoods. If this condition is met, then the actual tax burden would vary
considerably depending on the value of a given home in a given catchment. For
households with school age children, these modest additional tax burdens should
not be enough to dissuade them from approving a School Improvement District.
If the District is successful, the additional capitalization benefits would also prove
enticing.

106

The Penn Alexander case shows that introducing new school quality where it did
not previously exist can lead to dramatic growth in local land and housing prices.
It is worth pointing out some distinctions however, between the Penn Alexander
case and School Improvement Districts. In the Penn Alexander case,
households do not pay for the additional school quality – the University of
Pennsylvania does. Thus, the value (an estimated $132,000) that home buyers
place on the school is directly capitalized into home values. This same
capitalization effect could not be expected for the School Improvement District
case because any positive school quality capitalization effect will be partially
offset by the negative capitalization of a tax increase.

Aside from the work of Oates (1969)174, there appear to be no attempts in the
literature to estimate in a general sense, the negative capitalization effect
associated with a tax increase. This difficulty may stem from the fact that tax
rates are endogenous with both public service provision and home prices.
Nevertheless, we can expect that prices (and therefore District revenues) will
increase over time along with demand for in-District housing. Unfortunately, our
inability to estimate these capitalization effects, makes it difficult to quantify such
increases. It is likely however, that if these Districts are planned adequately
using these and other strategies as discussed above, the economic multipliers
(for both in-District residents and the City at-large) associated with School

174

Oates estimates negative capitalization rate associated with an increase in taxes without an equilibrium increase in
public service provision. He does so at the state level, and outside the context of a natural or quasi-experiment.
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Improvement Districts should vastly outweigh the costs associated with any
marginal tax increase.

Experience driven

To create a successful comprehensive plan for School Improvement Districts,
concerns must be addressed at three spatial levels: The first is the neighborhood
where planners must draw the boundaries of the Improvement District to raise
enough new tax revenue, ensure an appropriate residential economic mix, and
also provide enough housing such that the demand for the school does not
eventually outweigh the supply of classroom seats. The second level is District
administration. While these schools are managed by broader municipal school
districts, administrators at the city level are ill-prepared to market, manage and
oversee an Improvement District. Thus, the comprehensive plan must consider
the most effective and efficient to way to administer School Improvement
Districts. The final level is the school where new funds will be invested.
Although this dissertation does provide some literature on school reform
strategies particularly in cities, the preference for a given reform strategy and its
consequent execution is more the expertise of educators rather than planners.
Having said, this chapter is closed with some more general thoughts about how
District revenues might be expended.
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Penn Alexander was among the first examples of placed-based school
interventions at the elementary level and as such it provides an important
blueprint for planning School Improvement Districts. Although, it is important to
remember that Penn Alexander was heavily subsidized by a University and not
neighborhood residents, there are important lessons to be learned when it comes
to comprehensive planning. For one, although getting the neighborhood on
board with the new school was a requirement for the University of Pennsylvania,
University administrators prioritized community feedback. Dennis Culhane, a
professor who led much of the planning for the school recalls “closed-door
meeting among senior administrators”, which later expanded to established
neighborhood non-profits and finally the broader community175. Culhane recalls
census data on school-age children was used to model the “population
composition that might result” from Penn Alexander, but made no direct mention
about how the school catchment boundary was delineated.

Since equity plays such an important role in the School Improvement District
framework, I asked Culhane if affordable housing was considered during the
planning stage. Since the neighborhood had experienced had such high rates of
vacancy, he explained, there was not a lot of concern over affordable housing or
residential displacement. In fact, Culhane notes, “the more explicit goal was to
get people moving into the neighborhood and investing in it, not to preserve
affordability.”

175

Culhane (2014).

109

Eventually, toward year two and three of the program, attention did turn to the
preservation of affordable rental housing. “The idea”, Culhane said, “was and is
to hold onto a significant enough share of the rental market and to sit on the
rents…, so as to put downward pressure on other rental properties.” This idea
clearly draws a parallel to the strategy of going after Low Income Housing Tax
Credits before School Improvement District capitalization effects really begin to
take hold.

It is interesting to consider how far Philadelphia has come since the 1990s when
the Penn Alexander School was first being planned. Today, equity and limiting
residential displacement is a major policy concern within the City’s affordable
development community. I asked Culhane whether or not University officials
back then were concerned over residential displacement. He responded:

“Not really. The vacancy rate…was so significant in the West Philadelphia
area, and the need for middle class and professional families so great for
the tax base, that I don't think people seriously thought that Philadelphia
would be experiencing displacement. So, I don't think there was a sense,
other than through (affordable rental program), that there was much of a
moral compulsion to worry about price increases. Most people saw that
increased values, including out west of University City would increase
wealth and asset growth among working class families, and it did…It was
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probably the first time in decades that people had equity with which to
draw upon for improving their homes.

It is clear that the University was acutely aware that the provision of quality
schooling amenities would catalyze neighborhood economic development,
although it is interesting that displacement seemed a non-issue at the time.
Since then, as Chapter makes clear, Penn’s intervention has increased housing
costs dramatically.

Two important lessons emerge from the School Improvement District planning
process. First, given the magnitude increase in neighborhood demand
associated with providing school quality where it previously did not exist, it is vital
that affordable housing be constructed, not three years into the intervention but
well before the school first opens its doors. In the Penn Alexander case, the
University has the financial wherewithal to step in and purchase rental housing to
set aside as affordable. In the School Improvement District case, planners must
develop affordable housing while land prices are still at their pre-revitalization
levels. This is because subsidies like the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
program can only be used in low-income communities. The takeaway is clear –
invest in affordable housing before the neighborhood appreciates in value.

The second takeaway is that an initial, bounded, placed-based investment
ensures hyper-local economic multipliers. If planners wish to ensure that these
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multipliers are equitably distributed, they’re going to have pay great attention to
how the boundaries of these interventions are initially demarcated. Great detail
and attention will have to paid to the planning, development and administration of
School Improvement Districts to ensure both productive and equitable outcomes.

The democratic nature of Improvement Districts – the idea that a majority vote
among neighborhood residents is needed for passage, requires that District
administrators plan, advertise and meet with residents in an effort to court
potential voters. The organization responsible for School Improvement District
administration is going to have to be persuasive in order to convince households,
even those with school age children to vote to increase their own taxes. Paul
Levy, President of the Center City District, Philadelphia’s Business Improvement
District (BID) recalls the time when he had to initially convince voters of the tax
increase benefits. He told me, “it’s all about self-enlightened interest…Are you
willing to pay x dollars more per week to receive the direct benefits of your
payment to the District176?”

If business is the target of a BID, then promising cleaner/safer streets and
business marketing is a benefit that all commercial entities inside the BID can
take advantage of. However, schooling is a service that a disproportionate
number of residents will value directly. Everyone else must be convinced to vote
for the District solely on the argument that new school quality will bring with it

176

Levy (2015)

112

increased home values. Levy’s greatest concern is that residents will complain
that they pay enough taxes already – and that despite the fact that 55% of their
tax dollars currently go to schools, most schools have largely failed.

Only a coordinated and well-financed advocacy campaign and comprehensive
planning process can overcome this sentiment. When asked what he thought
was the greatest administrative concern for starting a small Improvement District,
Levy was quick to point out that someone has to “fund the upfront planning,
analysis, outreach and communications stage”. This means that foundation
support will likely be needed to fund the creation of a 501(c)(3). As this new
organization begins to plan and meet with communities, it must decide how it is
going to expend new revenues. In this regard, Levy made an interesting point
that the greatest draw for taxpayers would be to fund “external curb appeal
improvements, because that way everyone benefits from an upgrade in the
neighborhood, even those without kids.” A playground might be a good example
of an improvement that the whole neighborhood could benefit from.

In contrast, Ivy Olesh, President of the Friends of Chester Arthur (FoCA)
elementary school disagrees with Levy. Although, this “Friends of” non-profit
raised $150,000 from corporate and individual donations to build a new
playground, funding improvements inside of the school is equally important, she
argues. As discussed in Chapter 2, these “Friends of” groups represent an
innovative approach to school financing and likely the closest cousin to School
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Improvement Districts among comparable placed-based interventions. When
asked what the organization’s purpose is, Olesh replied:

“FoCA is an all-volunteer 501(c)(3)…formed by…community members to
support Arthur, a public, K-8 school…FoCA aims to raise money for
Arthur...(It) has a proven track record of being a good steward of finds to
ensure that everything raised is going to support the programs and
initiatives critical to Arthur’s success…(FoCA also) helps the school
market it successes to the large community around Arthur177.”

I asked Olesh why she thought that these “Friends of” groups had proliferated in
recent years. She said they have a low barrier for entry but that they can affect
key changes on micro levels. Not that raising thousands of dollars for external
improvements to the school does not represent important change, but I was more
curious about how an external group could finance internal change particularly
given the fact that her group has no agency within the School District of
Philadelphia. Olesh pointed out that to her, the two most important value-added
drivers of school quality are a good principal and great teachers, both of which
her group influenced. When one principal retired, Olesh sat on the selection
committee providing input on a replacement. FoCA, Olesh claims, “funds
teacher projects - bringing in programs that support the work they do and
hopefully making their jobs a bit easier.” Working one on one with the principal

177

Olesh (2015)
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and teachers to fund targeted professional development might be an interesting
avenue for a School Improvement District. There is experimental evidence to
suggest, as documented in Chapter 2, that improving teacher quality, particularly
in the early childhood years, can provide important value-added benefits to a
child’s education.

It would be interesting to conduct a survey of parents in a potential School
Improvement District to discover which interventions, either internal or external
they would be more willing to fund with their tax dollars. Of course, what
differentiates “Friends of” groups from Improvement Districts, is that donations to
the former is voluntary while tax payments to the latter would be required by law.
Notably, many who donate to FoCA do not have school-aged children. Olesh
claims that residents who donate do so because they are either “happy to see
good things happening for (Philadelphia schools); want their kids to be able to
attend the school; already have kids there; want their home prices to rise; or want
more residents to move into the neighborhood.” Clearly, there is a diversity of
motivations for residents to donate to the school. Among all these reasons,
however, Olesh points out that people are willing to donate because “we have a
neighborhood catchment.” She relays an anecdote where a parent’s group from
a Philadelphia high school asked her to come and speak about how FoCA
fundraises because the high school group was “struggling to engage
stakeholders”. This high school accepts students from across the city and is not
therefore, anchored to their local neighborhood as Chester Arthur is.
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Parents who donate to Chester Arthur realize that their investment catalyzes
additional neighborhood effects, while donations to an unanchored high school
yields none. If this understanding is innate among homeowners, then it will
surely be easier to convince voters of the efficacy of School Improvement
District.

The School Improvement District planning process is vital to the success of this
program. The quantitative approaches outlined in this chapter can help as first
pass – a filter, to highlight areas in the City where residents may be more inclined
to vote for a District and where, at least economically, it has the greatest chance
of succeeding. This exercise however, does not help overcome the massive
political hurdle confronting the successful implementation of these Districts –
namely the attitude that “I already pay property tax for schools! Why should I pay
more?” It is hard to argue with this logic. In a city like Philadelphia, where the
School District runs massive deficits and begs for bailouts from both the City and
the State, why should anyone believe that more money will truly make a
difference? I touch more on this point in the concluding chapter.

In the end, I’m not sure which will be the greatest selling point: That children will
receive a better education or that the value of housing assets will increase over
time. Given the direct relationship between home values and tax liabilities,
planners will have to come up with a clear and concise presentation that informs
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homeowners not only of the potential home appreciation but also how they can
leverage their assets to make additional investments in their own future.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

When a member of the audience at the 2014 Education Research Association’s
annual conference asked Mark Gleason, the Executive Director of the
Philadelphia School Partnership (PSP), why Philadelphia public schools don’t get
the funds they need, he responded emphatically, “Because it’s not about the
funds!178” Gleason’s organization, PSP, finances talent-centric approaches to
education reform – developing high quality teachers and better assessment tools,
among other strategies179. Their goal is to raise $100 million dollars to invest in
the expansion, transformation and opening of high quality schools in
Philadelphia180.

The argument that Gleason was underscoring was that taxpayers should not
invest their limited financial resources in schools that have significant structural
failures. The problem with this argument however, is that it confounds the issue
of financing with a host of other structural failures discussed in Chapter 2
including poverty-induced negative peer effects or a lack of value-added quality
such as good teachers. One can argue that investing in Philadelphia schools is a
sunk cost fallacy but how can one really discern the true cause of failure if the
schools can’t even afford to fund nurses and assistant principals? Poverty likely

178
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180

Hangley (2014)
Ibid.
PSP (2015)
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makes it more costly to educate a student from an impoverished neighborhood
than a student who comes from a suburb.

While Gleason himself might lament the role of financing, the actions of his
organization suggests otherwise. In the winter of 2015, PSP offered the School
District of Philadelphia $35 million to lessen the financial burden of adding new
charters to the portfolio of schools in Philadelphia181. As described in Chapter 2,
this money would go to offset fixed costs that remain on the District’s books when
a student moves from a District school to a charter. Examples might include
teacher salaries or the maintenance of school buildings. PSP’s offer proved
contentious in the run up to a meeting of the School Reform Commission, whose
job it was, as the state-mandated administrator of the Philadelphia School
District, to vote yea or nay on applications for 39 new charter schools182. Facing
pressure from a mostly Republican state legislature to approve the new charters
and pressure from Philadelphia school reformers to oppose, the School Reform
Commission ultimately approved 5 of the 39 charter applicants183. A little more
than a week later, Pennsylvania’s recently elected Democratic governor, Tom
Wolf ousted Bill Green from his position as chair of the School Reform
Commission. The governor cited as his motivation, Green’s support for
additional charters184.
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This anecdote – the latest in a saga, makes it apparent that school financing is
critical and has implications well beyond the education of Philadelphia’s children.
If the financing situation remains as is and Philadelphia has to rely solely on City
resources, the likely outcome is that traditional public schools will close in all but
the most well off neighborhoods (like that which surrounds the Penn Alexander
School); charters will proliferate in their place; and if these schools do not prove a
better alternative than District schools, human capital growth in Philadelphia will
continue to languish. Of course, as this dissertation makes clear, there are wideranging economic implications as well.

As discussed in Chapter 1, at a national level, lackluster education outcomes
have significant negative repercussions for future earnings potential. At a city
level – and in particularly for cities that rely on growing talent at home in addition
to attracting it from abroad, an under-educated workforce will inhibit productivity
otherwise associated with strong agglomeration economies. Finally, at the
neighborhood level, as mentioned Chapter 1, low education has a negative
feedback effect – where low quality schools yield ill-prepared students who go on
to earn disproportionally lower wages and then have no choice but to live in
disadvantaged neighborhoods with poor quality schools.

This dissertation demonstrates that school quality is a public good that can have
a tremendous impact on neighborhoods. The answer to research question one
regarding the willingness to pay for quality schools is an emphatic “yes”. Chapter
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5 shows how investment in quality schools where this quality previously did not
exist can be a major catalyst for neighborhood economic development. One of
the principal conclusions of this research is that school quality is one of the
greatest untapped economic development tools available to cities.

Increasing the level of school financing at the neighborhood level may be one
strategy for saving traditional public education while providing a new opportunity
to foster local economic development. While commitments from external
organizations like universities or “Friends of” groups are welcome, a more
systematic approach from cities will be required in order improve both
neighborhoods and schools.

One potential source of new property tax revenue is to rely on the changing
preferences for urban living that has encouraged many middle class families to
return to city neighborhoods. While gentrification represents a market approach
for raising additional revenue, it is unlikely to lead to equity. A second option is
for planners to harness their knowledge of comprehensive planning,
neighborhood planning and public finance to rewire the “circuits” that underlie the
economic relationships in neighborhoods.

Chapter 2 discusses at length, the relationship between the financing of local
public goods and the spatial organization of cities and neighborhoods in the U.S.
It is argued that ‘neighborhood choice’ is the principal driver of segregation and
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perpetuated urban poverty and how fiscal zoning and high housing costs are
used to lock out low-income residents in suburbs and cities respectively. It
suggests that given the persistent within-neighborhood clustering of economic
and social characteristics, planners must redefine the boundaries of
neighborhoods in order to equitably distribute public goods to a wide range of
income levels.

If low-income neighborhoods yield relatively lower property tax revenues from
which services like schools are financed, and the opposite is true for higherincome neighborhoods, then allow adjacent rich and poor neighborhoods to pool
their property taxes to jointly fund public goods. At some (yet unknown)
neighborhood size and ratio of rich and poor households, the following outcomes
may be achievable: First, newly generated tax revenues can support a
noticeable upgrade in public services. Second, when the new public services are
capitalized into home prices, there will already be a large enough supply of
affordable housing to effectively temper displacement pressures. Finally,
because property taxes are a function of home prices, new tax liabilities would be
equitably distributed across all rungs of the income ladder. In addition to these
features, there is also ample opportunity for additional equity to be created by
focusing affordable housing subsidies in these places as well. I discuss a variety
of these programs in Chapter 2 and argue that affordable housing subsidies
could have the greatest impact if they’re used to construct housing on land that is
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inexpensive today but will appreciate in the future in the face of new housing
demand.

Improvement Districts are one option that planners could use to rewire
neighborhoods in order to finance new school quality and the equitable
revitalization of neighborhoods. There is no reason that Improvement Districts
should only be used in downtowns and commercial corridors to bolster demand
for local businesses. It could be repurposed to support any number of public
services like parks, local transit or even job-training. It is the program’s electoral
requirement that makes it appealing but also makes it politically difficult to
achieve.

There is another placed-based program that is worth mentioning as an
alternative to School Improvement Districts. Tax-increment financing (TIF)
allows cities to float a bond for neighborhood improvement and then repay the
debt over time using the incremental increase in property taxes generated by the
improvements. The School Improvement District planning process and the
spatial structure of the program could both easily be adopted to fund ‘School
TIFs’. While these two programs would be very similar in most respects, what
really sets them apart, aside from how they raise new revenues, is the political
process underlying their authorization.
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While Neighborhood Improvement Districts in Pennsylvania require the consent
60% of neighborhood tax payers, tax-increment financing schemes require the
consent of city officials – namely City Council. At first glance, it may appear that
TIFs are easier to enact because they require fewer yea votes. Except, in a city
like Philadelphia, where each council person is the master of their own
councilmanic domain, one council person is unlikely to authorize new citywide
debt obligations to support a project outside of their own district. While the 60%
hurdle for Improvement Districts appears steep, outside council members are
unable to meddle in the electoral process.

Comprehensive planning, like the process described in Chapter 6 can play a
critical role in mitigating the political hurdles that might come with the
Improvement District electoral process. Planning is about the conception,
evaluation and advocacy of placed-based interventions - an all-encompassing
exercise that extends far beyond mere urban design. It’s about understanding
how people interact with the intangible, non-built environment characteristics of
places. It’s about how they value certain public goods and how they translate
this valuation into a willingness to consume a place. Hopefully this dissertation
has demonstrated a particular and applied use of these dynamics to plan a new
and unique program. Nevertheless, it is much more difficult to plan for situations
where the quality of these intangibles change and these placed-based dynamics
shift over time. In these instances, planners have largely failed thus far, to put
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forth viable strategies that provide equity in the face of gentrification. Look no
further than New York City and San Francisco as evidence of this fact.

If gentrification is the new norm, then in order to alleviate concerns of
displacement, planners have two options: First, they can topple regulatory
barriers and NIMBY objections to ensure that the supply of housing keeps up
with demand. This is the market-oriented approach. The second option is for
planners to rewire neighborhoods in order to alter the supply of and demand for
local public goods. This will likely help create a range of affordability options and
limit displacement in the face of new neighborhood investment. This strategy
can be coupled with traditional affordable housing schemes and to ensure better
outcomes for low-income residents, officials should forecast neighborhood
change and then construct affordable housing today in neighborhoods that will
appreciate in the future.

Planners must develop new ideas for cities experiencing rapid growth. Decades
after suburban living became the norm, planners now curse low-density living
and struggle to find ways to retrofit suburbs to make them more inclusive and
efficient. If the planning community fails to address shifting demand for urban
living, then they should expect to feel the same sort of remorse three or four
decades from now. Capital is mobile and the market will always allocate it to
places where the potential for a return is greatest. This shift marks a rare
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opportunity to capture this capital and reinvest it toward the betterment of those
less fortunate among us.
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APPENDIX 1: SCHOOL OUTCOMES & RACIAL DIVERSITY

This appendix asks whether there is a statistically significant relationship
between the number of students scoring proficient or advanced on math and
reading test scores and student racial diversity at the school level controlling for
other non-student neighborhood and school effects.
The data comes from the School District of Philadelphia’s Open Data Initiative185
and includes standardized test scores in reading and math for the school year
2011-2012. The data include a percentage breakdown of race, data on
enrollment and truancy, special education services and percentage of the student
body classified as low-income. A school zip code is provided which can help
control for across neighborhood differences. The largest source of omitted
variation in the data is at the teacher level.

The empirical strategy attempts to identify the role of diversity by estimating a
series of regressions with varying controls. Diversity is defined in using the
Simpson’s D statistic which was developed for quantifying species diversity in
ecosystems186. The statistic is formalized as follows:

=1−

185
186

∑ ( − 1)
( − 1)

School District of Philadelphia (2014)
Simpson (1949)
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Where N represents the total number of species (or in this case students), and n
represents the count of students per race. Simpson’s D is scaled between ‘0’
and ‘1’ where a value of ‘1’ represents the highest level of diversity. The School
District does not report raw counts of students by race, just percentages,
therefore the diversity measure is per 100 students. For each school, students
are broken down into 6 separate categories: African American, White, Asian,
Latino, Pacific Islander and American Indian. Figure T.1.1 displays the
distribution of D for all schools. Figure T.1.2 displays the distribution of
percentage white. Figure T.1.3 displays the spatial distribution of school
diversity.

Comparing across Figures T.1.1 and T.1.2, it becomes clear that the diversity
statistic is describing more than just the number of white students in a given
school. Percentage white is included as a robustness test for the models below.

Figure T.1.1: Histogram of school diversity for school year 2011-2012
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Figure T.1.2: Histogram of percent white for school year 2011-2012
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Figure T.1.3: Spatial distribution of Diversity (D) statistic for elementary schools in
Philadelphia

130

Data

The data consists of 236 non-charter, elementary, middle and high schools from
around Philadelphia in the year 2011- 2012. Table T.1.1 provides summary
statistics

There are two dependent variables in the below regressions. ‘readingScore’ and
‘mathScore’ describe the percentage of students who scored proficient or
advanced on Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) reading and
math tests respectively. The PSSA is Pennsylvania’s standardized assessment
test187. The School District aggregates test score data to the school level
averaged for all students in a school regardless of whether they took the test in
the 3rd, 8th or 11th grades. Figures T.1.4 and T.1.5 display the distribution of math
and reading scores respectively for the 2011-2012 school year. Although both
variables exhibit a normal tendency, reading scores are clearly more left skewed.

187

Pennsylvania Department of Education (2014)
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Statistic
SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES

SCH_ESOL_SERVICES
SCH_ATTENDANCE
SCH_ENROLLMENT
SCH_STUDENT_ENTERED

SCH_STUDENT_WITHDREW

readingScore

mathScore
AFRICAN_AMERICAN
WHITE
ASIAN
LATINO
PACIFIC_ISLANDER
AMERICAN_INDIAN
SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY
Diversity
Elem

Description
Percent of students
receiving special education
services
Percent of students
receiving english language
services
Percent of registered
student in attendence
Total enrollment
Total number of students
entering at the start of the
year
Total number of students
who withdrew by the end of
the year
Percentage of students
who scored proficient or
advanced on PSSA tests
Percentage of students
who scored proficient of
advanced on PSSA tests
Percentage of African
American students
Percentage of White
students
Percentage of Asian
students
Percentage of Latino
students
Percentage of Pacific
Islander students
Percentage of American
Indian students
Percentage of low income
students
Diversity D statistic
Elemenarty school fixed
effect

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

236

13.995

5.911

0.9

30.4

236

6.969

8.292

0

39

236

93.812

3.569

77.4

98.5

236

577.992

356.398

176

3,110

236

22.962

17.982

0

93

236

21.356

19.857

0

157

236

44.462

19.133

12

98

236

48.407

20.142

8

99

236

61.71

32.287

1.2

89.3

236

12.64

19.158

0

56.3

236

5.867

9.865

0

93

236

16.182

21.361

0

0

236

0

0

0

0

236

0

0

0

95.8

236

82.317

13.182

45.4

0.799

236

0.381

0.25

0.02

1

236

0.682

0.467

0

1

Table T.1.1: Summary statistics for school year 2011-2012

Figure T.1.4: Distribution of percent scoring proficient or advanced on PSSA math tests,
2011-2012
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Figure T.1.5: Distribution of percent scoring proficient or advanced on PSSA reading tests,
2011-2012

Methods

To test the hypothesis that racial diversity plays a statistically significant role in
school outcomes, several versions of the following regression is estimated:
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where Score is the percent of students across each school, i, who scored either
proficient or advanced on the PSSA reading or math test; SpecialEd and ESL are
the number of students in school, i, who receive special education and English as
a second language services respectively; Enroll is the number of students in
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school, i, who are registered to attend that school; LowInc is the percentage of
students who qualify as low-income; Attend is the attendance of students in school,
i, reported as a percentage; Elem is an elementary school fixed effect;
∑*)+ (

)(

)is a vector of zip code fixed effects; and Diversity is the coefficient of

interest, representing the D statistic as described above. In later specifications, as
a robustness test, Diversity is replaced with percent non-white.

The motivation of the research design is to identify diversity effects while holding
constant as many possible confounders as the data allow. Many of the included
variables deal with school level variation – chief among them is the low income
control. The zip code fixed effects are included to account for across neighborhood
effects.

For each outcome, a total of eight regressions are estimated beginning with the
diversity variable and then adding additional controls in subsequent regressions.
The hope is that the estimated coefficient on Diversity stabilizes as more controls
are added.

Results

Tables T.1.2 and T.1.3 present regression outputs for reading and math scores
respectively. The linear combination of independent variables explain nearly 80%
of the variation in the percentage of students who score proficient or advanced on
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the PSSA reading test. All coefficient signs appear reasonable. Figure T.1.6
presents a residual vs. predicted plot for regression 8 (with zip code fixed effects).
This plot suggests that it is unlikely that any systematic variation has been omitted
from the model.

The interpretation for the latter two regressions (with and without zip code fixed
effects respectively) is that all else equal, a 10% increase in the diversity D statistic,
leads to roughly a 1.7% - 2% increase in the number of students who score
proficient or advanced on the test188.

This result is statistically significant.

Entrance of the zip code fixed effects renders the special education and school
enrollment variables insignificant, but they also decrease the coefficient on the
percent low income variable as expected.

With respect to the math score regressions, the linear combination of independent
variables explain nearly 74% of the variation in the percentage of students who
score proficient or advanced on the PSSA math test. Figure T.1.7 presents a
residual vs. predicted plot for regression 8 (with zip code fixed effects). Like the
reading score regression, this plot suggests that it is unlikely that any systematic
variation has been omitted from the model.

The interpretation of the latter two regressions suggest that all else equal, a 10%
increase in the diversity D statistic leads to a roughly a 1.6% - 1.8% increase in the

188

Although all variables are untransformed, the data are in percentages, hence the interpretation is as well.
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number of students who score proficient or advanced on the test. These results
are statistically significant.

As a check for robustness, Tables T.1.4 and T.1.5 rerun the regressions
substituting the diversity variable for percent white. The models explain 74% and
78% in the number students scoring proficient or advanced on reading and math
tests respectively. For the reading and math tests regressions, all else equal, a
10% increase in percent white leads to roughly a 1.6% and 1.9% increase in the
number of students who score proficient or advanced on the test.

Conclusions

This analysis presented here asks whether school racial diversity is correlated with
the percentage of students who score proficient or advanced on test outcomes.
Attempting to identify the diversity effect using a series of school level controls
gathered from an open dataset provided by the Philadelphia School District, this
analysis finds that racial diversity has a marginal yet statistically significant positive
effect on outcomes.

Surprisingly, percent white also leads to a marginal response to the percentage of
students scoring proficient or advanced on tests189.

189

Additional tests were undertaken (not included) where percent white was log transformed. Figure T.1.2 shows percent
white is right skewed but transforming it does not lead to a particularly normal distribution. The regression results were
mostly comparable to the non-transformed results.
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These results are cross-sectional and correlative in nature and should not be
interpreted as causal – particularly considering that these tests ignore the form and
function of potential school-level peer effects. However, they do provide additional
motivation for the School Improvement District concept. Namely, that drawing
District boundaries to include a diverse mix of students may improve outcomes
across the board.

It would be ideal to rerun these tests focused not on racial diversity but income
diversity, although these data are not released by the School District. Despite the
unavailability of these data, both the low-income and neighborhood variables are
important controls in the analysis presented here.
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Dependent Variable: Reading Score
1

7

8†

-0.303**
-0.119

-0.122
-0.14

-0.284***
-0.089

-0.284***
-0.088

-0.273**
-0.118

2.544***
-0.229

2.463***
-0.226

2.174***
-0.251

2.386***
-0.283

-0.011***
-0.002

-0.004**
-0.002

-0.004**
-0.002

-0.005***
-0.002

-0.003
-0.002

3.592**
-1.656

2.526
-1.602

-8.116***
-1.611

-7.387***
-1.597

-7.496***
-1.579

-0.850***
-0.094

-1.057***
-0.063

-1.084***
-0.064

-1.106***
-0.061

-0.797***
-0.057

-0.750***
-0.058

-0.745***
-0.057

-6.905***
-1.775

2

3

4

5

6

SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES

SCH_ESOL_SERVICES

SCH_ATTENDANCE

SCH_ENROLLMENT

Elem

SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY

Diversity

0.328***
-0.045

0.107***
-0.033

0.104***
-0.033

0.159***
-0.034

0.106***
-0.028

0.167***
-0.033

0.173***
-0.033

0.202***
-0.063

Constant

31.959***
-2.054

127.373***
-5.859

127.284***
-5.814

133.873***
-5.744

-124.585***
-23.73

-121.923***
-23.288

-90.376***
-26.132

-115.439***
-29.831

236
0.785
0.78
8.976

236
0.794
0.788
8.803

236
0.799
0.793
8.699

236
0.83
0.784
8.887

167.535***

146.841***

129.812***

18.082***

Observations

236
236
236
236
0.185
0.63
0.638
0.669
R2
0.181
0.627
0.633
0.663
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
17.312
11.682
11.591
11.102
F Statistic
53.018***
198.653*** 136.110*** 116.747***
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0 Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted

Table T.1.2: Regression summary for reading scores
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Dependent Variable: Math Score
1

2

3

4

6

7
-0.088
-0.142

8†
0.177
-0.161

0.032
-0.105

0.032
-0.105

0.042
-0.135

2.829***
-0.264

2.838***
-0.266

2.754***
-0.299

3.018***
-0.324

-0.005**
-0.002
1.069
-1.879

-0.005**
-0.002
1.037
-1.883

-0.004
-0.003
2.331
-2.035

5

SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES

SCH_ESOL_SERVICES

SCH_ATTENDANCE

-0.012***
-0.003
14.190***
-1.884

12.984***
-1.824

-0.005**
-0.002
1.15
-1.856

-0.876***
-0.079

-0.985***
-0.073

-1.011***
-0.07

-0.666***
-0.066

-0.671***
-0.068

-0.670***
-0.068

-0.918***
-0.108

SCH_ENROLLMENT
Elem

SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY

Diversity

0.357***
-0.047

0.173***
-0.042

0.164***
-0.037

0.225***
-0.038

0.166***
-0.032

0.159***
-0.039

0.161***
-0.039

0.180**
-0.072

Constant

34.822***
-2.146

113.966***
-7.363

113.617***
-6.614

121.074***
-6.538

-166.329***
-27.339

-166.628***
-27.411

-157.446***
-31.167

-179.730***
-34.198

236
236
236
236
0.197
0.473
0.577
0.613
R2
0.193
0.469
0.571
0.606
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
18.091)
14.679
13.187
12.636
F Statistic
57.317***
104.724*** 105.433***
91.523***
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0 Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted

236
0.742
0.736
10.341
132.307***

236
0.742
0.735
10.362
109.836***

236
0.743
0.735
10.376
93.948***

236
0.799
0.744
10.188
14.670***

Observations

Table T.1.3: Regression summary for math scores

Figure T.1.6: Residual vs. predicted plot for Reading Score regression 8 (with zip code
fixed effects)
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Figure T.1.7: Residual vs. predicted plot for Math Score regression 8 (with zip code fixed
effects)
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Dependent Variable: Reading Score
7

8†

-0.337***
-0.123

-0.177
-0.142

-0.031
-0.074

-0.022
-0.073

-0.034
-0.121

2.769***
-0.227

2.770***
-0.228

2.467***
-0.25

2.551***
-0.282

-0.007***
-0.002

-0.002
-0.002

-0.002
-0.002

-0.003
-0.002

-0.001
-0.002

3.286*
-1.701

2.583
-1.682

-9.455***
-1.644

-9.395***
-1.654

-9.687***
-1.634

-8.606***
-1.851

-1.042***
-0.074

-1.080***
-0.076

-1.115***
-0.076

-0.702***
-0.068

-0.699***
-0.069

-0.680***
-0.068

-0.814***
-0.108

0.549***
-0.055

0.106**
-0.051

0.091*
-0.052

0.099*
-0.051

0.143***
-0.04

0.143***
-0.04

0.161***
-0.04

0.163**
-0.074

37.528***
-1.25

128.878***
-6.585

129.956***
-6.57

137.314***
-6.831

-151.829***
-24.338

-152.094***
-24.39

-119.888***
-26.771

-124.945***
-30.787

236
0.783
0.778
9.009

236
0.783
0.777
9.025

236
0.79
0.784
8.899

236
0.825
0.778
9.016

165.997***

137.862***

122.595***

17.464***

1

2

3

4

5

6

SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES

SCH_ESOL_SERVICES

SCH_ATTENDANCE

SCH_ENROLLMENT

Elem

SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY

WHITE

Constant

Observations

236
236
236
236
0.302
0.621
0.627
0.643
R2
0.299
0.618
0.622
0.637
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
16.022
11.829
11.76
11.528
F Statistic
101.094*** 190.893*** 129.999*** 104.076***
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0 Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted

Table T.1.4: Regression summary for reading scores using percent white as coefficient of
interest
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Dependent Variable: Math Score
1

2

3

4

5

6

0.121
-0.161

0.270***
-0.085

0.274***
-0.085

0.286**
-0.137

3.169***
-0.266

3.160***
-0.261

3.029***
-0.291

3.168***
-0.32

-0.007***
-0.003

-0.001
-0.002

-0.003
-0.002

-0.003
-0.002

-0.003
-0.003

13.724***
-1.961

13.024***
-1.95

-0.753
-1.922

-1.28
-1.893

-1.407
-1.897

0.499
-2.096

-0.823***
-0.094

-0.981***
-0.088

-1.016***
-0.088

-0.543***
-0.08

-0.566***
-0.079

-0.558***
-0.079

-0.846***
-0.122

0.555***
-0.058

0.206***
-0.064

0.140**
-0.059

0.148**
-0.059

0.198***
-0.046

0.194***
-0.046

0.202***
-0.046

0.194**
-0.084

41.391***
-1.338

113.524***
-8.288

118.022***
-7.574

125.346***
-7.92

-205.560***
-28.449

-203.246***
-27.916

-189.324***
-31.07

-191.999***
-34.875

236
0.732
0.727
10.53

236
0.744
0.737
10.329

236
0.745
0.737
10.328

236
0.798
0.743
10.214

125.960***

110.765***

95.107***

14.579***

SCH_ESOL_SERVICES

SCH_ATTENDANCE

SCH_ENROLLMENT

Elem

SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY

WHITE

Constant

Observations

8†

7
-0.145
-0.143

SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES

236
236
236
236
0.279
0.458
0.553
0.567
R2
0.276
0.454
0.547
0.56
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
17.143
14.888
13.557
13.365
F Statistic
90.413***
98.579***
95.587***
75.682***
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0 Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted

Table T.1.5: Regression summary for math scores using percent white as coefficient of
interest
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APPENDIX 2: SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS POLICY BRIEF

Summary:

Philadelphia’s public schools are wrestling with the realities of fiscal insolvency.
To close a $400 million deficit, the City recently closed 23 schools and laid off
nearly 20% of the total District workforce. While the human capital repercussions
will be felt for generations to come, there will also be significant neighborhood
economic impacts as well. The research accompanying this project concludes
emphatically that despite Philadelphia being a school quality ‘desert’, good
schools still fetch a premium and great schools have the power to transform a
neighborhood.

This document briefly outlines the motivation and design of an original program
idea called School Improvement Districts – bounded areas whose residents vote
to increase their own taxes and use the incremental increase to fund new school
quality in their own neighborhoods. While the program is placed-based and thus
intended to be used as a tool for neighborhood development, a principle focus on
equity will ensure that vital human capital spillovers are generated as well.

Motivation:
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The charter school movement in Philadelphia will continue to gain momentum
and the exodus from District schools will hasten particularly in the wake of recent
state legislation. The economics of this transformation will further degrade
school quality by forcing the District to mitigate its fixed costs by issuing more
layoffs and closing more schools. Although at face value, charters are not poor
alternatives, unlike New York and Chicago which saw charter growth as a means
of education innovation, in Philadelphia, their emergence is mainly in response to
market forces.

Why is this a problem for neighborhoods? District schools are anchored to local
neighborhoods - thus a decline in District school demand will lead to a
corresponding decline in neighborhood demand. If we capitalize on this
mechanism but in reverse, the question becomes – can we leverage demand for
schools, particularly in “gentrifying” neighborhoods, to foster positive human
capital and neighborhood economic development outcomes. Can this be done
equitably?

Supporting research:

How might we identify the extent to which schools play a role in neighborhood
demand? The research that accompanies this project estimates the willingness
to pay for public schools by Philadelphia home buyers by way of a quasiexperiment – relating (in a regression framework) differences in test scores with
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differences in home prices for home sales on either immediate side of school
attendance catchments. This framework can identify school related home price
premiums separate from other non-school neighborhood amenities.

In Philadelphia, despite the current school crisis and a portfolio of underperforming schools, a one standard deviation increase in test scores leads to
nearly a 3% increase in home prices on average. In addition to the citywide
analysis, this research also tested the local economic development effects of
introducing a high-quality school in a neighborhood that previously lacked school
quality. Using the University-subsidized, Penn Alexander School as a case
study, a decade after the school’s debut, the research estimates that the average
home buyer was willing to pay a 40% (nearly $140k) home price premium to
purchase a house in the school’s attendance catchment.

These results suggest that good schools can be a major driver of economic
development in Philadelphia.

Policy Description:

The Improvement District mechanism is used to fund increased service provision
typically in downtowns toward the benefit of local business. In 2000,
Pennsylvania enacted legislation approving ‘Neighborhood Improvement
Districts’ suggesting that, “…taxes many times are not sufficient to provide
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adequate municipal services…" and that, "municipalities should be encouraged
to create, where feasible…assessment-based neighborhood improvement
districts…” administered by, “…district management associations…that promote
and enhance more attractive and safer…neighborhoods; economic growth;
increased employment opportunities; and improved commercial, industrial,
business districts and business climates." It is believed that this legislation
provides the legal framework to support School Improvement Districts.

School Improvement Districts would allow local residents to vote to increase their
own taxes and put the incremental difference toward their local school. It is
envisioned that these Districts would be managed by a local community
development non-profit that has the experience and staff to manage such an
entity. Because the new school quality will be capitalized into local home prices,
this program must be accompanied by a series of equity interventions that will
encourage housing affordability. The most important means to achieve equity is
to draw the District boundary to encompass a mixed-income neighborhood which
would give planners greater control over the supply of and demand for public
services like schools. Although the Improvement District tax rate is flat, the tax is
made more progressive by the fact that the tax liability is a function of home
price. Thus, the tax liability of lower valued homes will be less than that on
higher valued homes. Although all in-District residents will receive an equal
share of the new school quality, the costs will be more equitably distributed. The
second major equity component would use the promise of new school quality to
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win low income housing tax credits which can then be used to build affordable
housing in the neighborhood before the new school drives economic and
demographic neighborhood change and possible displacement.

Conclusion

Education is routinely seen as the most important mechanism for elevating
children out of poverty. It is incumbent upon planners to break the negative
feedback cycle where low quality schools yield ill-prepared students who grow up
to earn disproportionally lower wages and are forced to live in disadvantaged
neighborhoods with low-quality schools. To incentivize officials to adopt policies
effective in this regard, the proposed program considers schools not only as
drivers of human capital development but as engines of economic development
as well. School Improvement Districts may provide one policy mechanism to
bolster education outcomes while simultaneously driving the equitable
revitalization of neighborhoods.
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Dennis Culhane, Professor, Penn School of Social Work

1. What did the West Philadelphia Initiatives planning process entail?
2. Was affordable housing development considered a component of the plan?
Why or why not?
3. How did you project future housing demand in the neighborhood?
4. Did University officials ever consider the possibility that the intervention could
lead to residential displacement?
5. Did any city officials (politicians or otherwise) express any concern over the
University exerting its considerable financial might to revitalize the
neighborhood?
6. What was the response of local residents and did this response vary
according to the resident’s class or race?
7. What are the lessons that we can learn from Penn Alexander when trying to
plan similar interventions in other neighborhoods?

Paul Levy, President & CEO, Center City District Philadelphia

1. Are you ever asked by businesses who pay the Improvement District tax if
they can opt out? What is their motivation and how do you address their
concerns?
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2. How have you been successful in convincing Improvement District taxpayers
that the services Center City District provides help make a difference?
3. Talk about the “marketing” process that helped convince local businesses to
vote for the Improvement District legislation.
4. Who sets the District tax rate? How often does this change?
5. How did you make the move in 2009 from charging only businesses to
charging residents as well?
6. How are budget expenditure decisions made?
7. Do you think the Improvement District model can be adopted to fund schools?
If so, what are the key considerations?
8. What are the administrative concerns particularly as it relates to starting a
small Improvement District?

Ivy Olesh, President of the Friends of Chester Arthur

1. What is the purpose of the Friends of Chester Arthur?
2. Why do you think that these “Friends of” groups have grown in popularity in
recent years?
2. How do you convince both parents and non-parents to donate? Do any
neighborhood businesses donate?
3. Is the free-rider problem ever an issue?
4. Who/by what process are budgetary decisions made?
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5. Do neighborhood residents ever express concerns over equity? What are
they?
6. What drivers of school quality cannot be paid for by the Friends of group but
instrumental in the success of Chester Arthur?
7. Do you think the majority of residents would vote to make their donations
more formal in the form of a tax increase?
8. Do you think the success of the school has spilled over into other aspects of
the neighborhood economy? If so, what?

Kira Strong, Vice President of Community and Economic Development,
People’s Emergency Center (PEC)

1. To what do you owe the success of your affordable housing programs?
2. Does PEC have a comprehensive plan in place to address equity? What are
the specifics?
3. How do you leverage the encroaching University-driven neighborhood change
when applying for Low Income Housing Tax Credits?
4. Discuss the extent of PEC’s partnership with Drexel University?
5. Would an organization like PEC (given the appropriate funding) make an
adequate home for District administration?
6. Do you consider education (of any kind) to play an important role in
community development?
7. How do you plan to provide equity in the face of Drexel’s new school given the
Penn Alexander story?
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